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THE SUPREME COURT’S LOVE–HATE
RELATIONSHIP WITH MIRANDA
KIT KINPORTS *
In recent years, the Supreme Court has enjoyed a love–hate
relationship with its landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona. While the
Court has not hesitated to narrow Miranda’s reach, it has also been wary of
deliberate efforts to circumvent it. This pragmatic approach to Miranda
can be doctrinally unsatisfying and even incoherent at times, but it
basically maintains the core structure of Miranda as the police have come
to know and adapt to it.
Last Term provided the first glimpse of the Roberts Court’s views on
Miranda, as the Court considered three cases: Maryland v. Shatzer, Florida
v. Powell, and Berghuis v. Thompkins. This Article examines each opinion
through a pragmatic lens, with an eye towards ascertaining whether the
Roberts Court remains committed to the pragmatic approach taken by its
predecessors. While the Government prevailed on every issue raised by the
three cases, the opinions vary in their fidelity to pragmatic norms.
The Article concludes that, even if Shatzer and Powell can be
dismissed as effecting only incremental changes in the law—in the rules
protecting those who invoke their Miranda rights, defining custody, and
requiring that the warnings reasonably convey each of the rights Miranda
guarantees—Thompkins cannot be defended on pragmatic grounds. In
effect, the decision in Thompkins allows the police to begin interrogating a
suspect immediately after reading the Miranda warnings, without first
securing a waiver of Miranda, and then to use anything she says—even
hours later—to demonstrate that she impliedly waived her rights.
Thompkins thus essentially reduces Miranda to a mere formality, requiring
that warnings be read and otherwise leaving criminal defendants protected
only by the same voluntariness due process test that Miranda was designed
to replace. To the extent Thompkins signals a change in the Court’s
attitude towards Miranda, it comes at a particularly critical time given
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recent suggestions that Congress create an exception to Miranda for
terrorism suspects.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s recent attitude towards its landmark ruling in
Miranda v. Arizona 1 seems to be one of studied ambivalence. On the one
hand, the Court has ruthlessly cut back on Miranda, construing it narrowly2
and creating exceptions,3 thereby “[w]eakening” its protections and
“softening [its] impact.” 4 On the other hand, the Court has resisted blatant
attempts to subvert Miranda, whether on the part of Congress or individual
police officers. In my view, the Court has adopted a pragmatic approach to
Miranda. While it can be doctrinally unsatisfying and even incoherent at
times, this pragmatic approach basically maintains the essential core
structure of the Miranda rules and exceptions as the police have come to
know them, while being wary of deliberate efforts to circumvent them. 5
Chief Justice Warren’s opinion in Miranda has always been
surrounded by controversy. Even though the five-to-four decision was in

1

384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (requiring that certain “procedural safeguards” be accorded to
suspects who are both in custody and subjected to interrogation).
2
See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (requiring that invocations of the
Miranda right to counsel must be unambiguous); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436–
39 (1984) (holding that traffic and Terry stops do not satisfy the Miranda definition of
“custody” even though they are Fourth Amendment “seizures”); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291, 294–95, 300–03 (1980) (finding that police officers did not engage in interrogation
when one commented to another within suspect’s earshot, “God forbid one of [the
handicapped children] might find [the murder weapon] . . . and hurt themselves”).
3
See, e.g., United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 633 (2004) (creating an exception to
the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine for physical evidence discovered as the result of a
Miranda violation); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (refusing to apply the fruits of
the poisonous tree doctrine to consecutive-confession cases, where a Miranda violation is
followed by warnings and a second statement); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655–56
(1984) (recognizing a public safety exception to Miranda).
4
Yale Kamisar, On the Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda Case: Why We Needed It,
How We Got It—and What Happened to It, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 163, 178, 184 (2007); see
also Arthur J. Goldberg, Escobedo and Miranda Revisited, 18 AKRON L. REV. 177, 182
(1984) (arguing that Miranda has been left “twisting slowly in the wind”).
5
Cf. Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors,
and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1061
(2001) (observing that most of the Supreme Court opinions creating exceptions to Miranda
“involved a good faith or unintentional violation of the prophylactic rule, coupled with
particularly high costs for implementing the rule”).
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many respects a compromise 6—the Court did not ban any particular
interrogation technique 7 or require the presence of counsel during police
interrogations 8—it immediately encountered resistance. Just two years
after the Court issued the decision, Congress enacted the 1968 Crime
Control Bill aimed at overturning it.9 During the 1968 presidential
campaign, Richard Nixon urged Congress to pass the bill, calling Miranda a
“legal technicalit[y]” that had “very nearly rule[d] out the ‘confession’ as an
effective . . . tool in . . . law enforcement.” 10 Twenty years later, the
Reagan Justice Department, under Attorney General Edwin Meese,
described the Miranda ruling as “a derelict on the waters of the law,” and
proclaimed that “[o]verturning Miranda would . . . be among the most
important achievements of this administration . . . in restoring the power of
self-government to the people . . . in the suppression of crime.” 11
But when the 1968 legislation ultimately reached the Supreme Court in
2000 in Dickerson v. United States, Chief Justice Rehnquist, a longtime
critic of Miranda, surprised many Court-watchers by writing the majority

6

See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century
Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1, 12 (1995) (noting that “the Court was barely able to go as far
as it did,” and “at the time it was probably not possible to persuade a majority of the Court to
go one inch further”); George C. Thomas III, “Truth Machines” and Confessions Law in the
Year 2046, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 215, 218 (2007) (maintaining that “Miranda was not a
revolution” but instead “a compromise, a quintessentially mid-60s compromise”).
7
See, e.g., FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS
1 (2d ed. 1967) (commenting, one year after Miranda, that “all but a very few of the
interrogation tactics and techniques presented in our earlier publication are still valid if used
after the recently prescribed warnings have been given to the suspect . . . , and after he has
waived his self-incrimination privilege and his right to counsel”).
8
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966) (“This does not mean . . . that each
police station must have a ‘station house lawyer’ present at all times to advise prisoners.”);
cf. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 22–25, Miranda, 384
U.S. 436 (Nos. 759-761, 584) (urging the Court to ban interrogations absent the presence of
counsel); Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to
Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1830 (1987) (proposing that police be
prohibited from questioning suspects who have not consulted with a lawyer).
9
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006) (providing that confessions are admissible in federal court so
long as they are “voluntarily made,” taking into account “all the circumstances surrounding
the giving of the confession”); see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 436, 442
(2000) (concluding that “Congress intended by its enactment to overrule Miranda” by
“reinstat[ing]” the voluntariness due process test that Miranda sought to replace). See
generally Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress “Overrule” Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
883 (2000).
10
RICHARD M. NIXON, TOWARD FREEDOM FROM FEAR, reprinted in 114 CONG. REC.
12,936–39 (1968).
11
OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
ON THE LAW OF PRETRIAL INTERROGATION (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 437,
565 (1989).
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opinion striking the statute down. 12 Despite language in prior Supreme
Court decisions referring to Miranda warnings as “prophylactic” rules,
“procedural safeguards associated with” the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, and “not themselves rights protected by the
Constitution,” 13 the seven Justices in the Dickerson majority concluded that
Miranda was “a constitutional decision” that “may not be in effect
overruled by an Act of Congress.” 14 The Court did not go so far as to
wholeheartedly embrace the Warren Court’s decision, cautioning that
“[w]hether or not we would agree with Miranda’s reasoning and its
resulting rule . . . in the first instance, . . . Miranda has become embedded in
routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of
our national culture.” 15 Thus, Dickerson “froze in place the status quo,” 16
even though in so doing it did not create a particularly tidy jurisprudential
package. 17
Three years later, in Missouri v. Seibert, a plurality of the Court
likewise invalidated the “question-first” interrogation technique, a “practice

12

Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 430. As an Associate Justice, Rehnquist was the author of the
plurality opinion in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974), which first described the
Miranda rights as “prophylactic rules.” For theories attempting to explain Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s vote in Dickerson, see Kamisar, supra note 4, at 199–201.
13
Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444; see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985) (“[T]he
Miranda exclusionary rule . . . sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself [and]
may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation.”); New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (referring to Miranda warnings as “procedural safeguards
associated with the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination” that “provide[]
‘practical reinforcement’ for the Fifth Amendment right”) (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444).
14
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432. The Court “concede[d],” however, that “language in
some of our opinions . . . support[ed] the view taken by” the Fourth Circuit in upholding the
federal statute. Id. at 438.
15
Id. at 443.
16
Klein, supra note 5, at 1077.
17
See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court’s Failures in
Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 898, 898, 900 (2001) (noting that his initial response to the
Court’s decision was to wonder, “Where’s the rest of the opinion?” and concluding that “this
result-oriented ‘success’ came at the great cost of any pretense of consistency in the Court’s
doctrine”); R. Ted Cruz, In Memoriam: William H. Rehnquist, 119 HARV. L. REV. 10, 15
(2005) (observing that the Court’s reasoning was not “the tightest of logical syllogisms,” and
describing the decision as saying, “[f]irst, Miranda is NOT required by the Constitution” but
is “merely prophylactic”; “[s]econd, 18 U.S.C. § 3501 is not good law”; and “[t]hird, do not
ask why, and please, never, ever, ever cite this opinion for any reason”); Donald A. Dripps,
Constitutional Theory for Criminal Procedure: Dickerson, Miranda, and the Continuing
Quest for Broad-but-Shallow, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 3 (2001) (pointing out that
Dickerson was a “compromise opinion, intentionally written to say less rather than more, for
the sake of achieving a strong majority on the narrow question of Miranda’s continued
vitality”). For further discussion of Dickerson, see infra notes 370–73 and accompanying
text.
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of some popularity” that had been “promoted” in certain police
departments. 18 Police using this tactic made a “‘conscious decision’” to
start interrogating a suspect without first reading Miranda warnings. 19
Then later, after they elicited a statement that was concededly inadmissible
(because of the Miranda violation), they would belatedly provide Miranda
warnings, secure a waiver, and “cover the same ground a second time”
“‘until [they got] the answer that [the suspect] already provided once.’”20
Calling question-first interrogation “a police strategy adapted to undermine
the Miranda warnings,” the plurality refused to allow the prosecution to
introduce the second statement Seibert made following the administration
of Miranda. 21
Despite cases like Seibert, the police have generally made their peace
with Miranda, and so seemingly has the Court. In large measure, law
enforcement has successfully “adapted” to the Warren Court’s decision.
For example, police officers regularly “de-emphasize the significance” of
the Miranda warnings in various ways: reading them in a “perfunctory” or
“bureaucratic” tone of voice, suggesting they are “a mere formality . . . to
dispense with prior to questioning”; “undermining the . . . warnings’ effect”
by “focusing the suspect’s attention on the importance of telling his story”;
or “treat[ing] the suspect’s waiver of the warnings as a fait accompli.” 22
Whether because of these tactics, or because the warnings themselves are
simply unable to dispel the inherent coerciveness of interrogation,23 the
overwhelming majority of suspects waive their rights and agree to talk to

18

Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 609–10 (2004) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 605–06 (quoting police officer’s suppression hearing testimony).
20
Id. at 604–06 (quoting police officer’s suppression hearing testimony).
21
Id. at 615–16. Seibert was initially questioned without warnings for about half an hour
and then, after she made an incriminating statement and was given a break, the police
“turned on a tape recorder, gave [her] the Miranda warnings, and obtained a signed waiver
of rights from her.” Id. at 605. But cf. Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling
(with Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 21 (2010) (arguing that
“the fractured opinions [in Seibert] in effect instructed police on how to ignore Miranda”).
For further discussion of Seibert, see infra notes 366–69 and accompanying text.
22
Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators’
Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 433–37
(1999). But cf. Kamisar, supra note 4, at 186 (arguing that “‘circumventing,’ ‘evading,’ or
‘disregarding’” are “more accurate” terms than “‘adapting’ or ‘adjusting’”).
23
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 536 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) (“But if
the defendant may not answer without a warning . . . without having his answer be a
compelled one, how can the Court ever accept his negative answer to the question of whether
he wants to consult . . . counsel . . . ?”); Ogletree, supra note 8, at 1838 (criticizing the
Miranda Court for “assum[ing] that the simple act of having the interrogator read the
warnings to the suspect could offset the coercive atmosphere sufficiently” for a valid
waiver).
19
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the police without the assistance of counsel.24 Thus, Miranda ultimately led
to “an equilibrium that both police officers and courts, the regulated and the
regulators, were willing to live with.”25 The Court’s pragmatic approach to
Miranda has maintained that equilibrium, such that Chief Justice Rehnquist
was able to announce in Dickerson that “subsequent cases have reduced the
impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming
the decision’s core ruling that unwarned statements may not be used as
evidence in the prosecution’s case in chief.”26
Against this backdrop, the first clues as to the Roberts Court’s views
on Miranda came last Term. The Court jumped right in, granting cert in
three cases—Maryland v. Shatzer, 27 Florida v. Powell, 28 and Berghuis v.
Thompkins 29—that together raised questions spanning the range of issues
that arise under Miranda. On each occasion, the Government prevailed. In
fact, the three cases involved eight separate Miranda issues, each of them
resolved in favor of the prosecution. This Article uses these opinions as the
vehicle to test the Roberts Court’s commitment to the pragmatic approach
to Miranda. In examining the cases through a pragmatic lens, I evaluate
them on several levels: whether they make only incremental changes in the
law or tread new ground, both in terms of Supreme Court precedent and the
trend among the lower courts; whether the Court can justify its ruling on
pragmatic grounds or instead leaves the door open to law enforcement
efforts to circumvent Miranda; and whether the opinions are one-sided or
sensitive to the concerns of suspects facing custodial interrogation.
Part II of the Article begins with Maryland v. Shatzer, which cut back
on Miranda in two respects: first, the Court created a break-in-custody
exception to the Edwards rule that protects suspects who invoke their
rights, 30 and second, it ruled that inmates serving prison sentences are not in

24
See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, Miranda’s Irrelevance: Questioning the Relevance of
Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1009 (2001) (citing studies
finding that about 80% of suspects waive their rights); George C. Thomas III, Stories About
Miranda, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1959, 1976 (2004) (reporting similar figures, and noting that
“[m]ore than 10 times as many suspects waived Miranda as invoked” their rights).
25
William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 999 (2001); see also,
e.g., CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A FIRSTHAND
ACCOUNT 45 (1991) (observing that law enforcement officials “learned to live with Miranda,
and even to love it, to the extent that it provided them with a safe harbor”); Leo, supra note
24, at 1021, 1027 (commenting that “police have transformed Miranda into a tool of law
enforcement” such that “Miranda has now become a standard part of the machine”).
26
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443–44 (2000).
27
130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010).
28
130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010).
29
130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).
30
Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1219–24.
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“custody” for purposes of Miranda. 31 Despite ruling against Shatzer on
both issues and extending Supreme Court precedent in defining custody, the
majority opinion was consistent with a pragmatic approach to Miranda and
somewhat sensitive to the policies underlying that decision. In fact, it
contained language protective of suspects’ rights on other questions the
Court had not clearly resolved on prior occasions. 32
In Florida v. Powell, which is the focus of Part III, the Court upheld a
variation on the Miranda warnings given to the suspect there, rejecting his
argument that the police did not adequately inform him of the right to have
an attorney with him in the interrogation room. 33 Although the opinion was
tied to the narrow facts of the case, it departed from both the Court’s own
precedent and lower court case law and is harder to defend on pragmatic
grounds.
In the final case, Berghuis v. Thompkins, which is analyzed in Part IV,
the Court resolved four issues directly and a fifth implicitly, all in favor of
the prosecution. Two of the rulings—that suspects must unequivocally
invoke the right to silence and that this clear invocation requirement applies
even where a suspect did not initially agree to waive her rights—endorsed
the prevailing lower court view and therefore may have been expected, even
though they are difficult to reconcile with a pragmatic approach.34 But the
more significant holdings—that Thompkins did not successfully invoke his
right to silence by remaining silent, that he impliedly waived Miranda by
giving a one-word answer to a question almost three hours into the
interrogation, 35 and that the police do not have to secure a Miranda waiver
prior to initiating interrogation36—cannot be justified on pragmatic grounds.
Thus, I conclude that while Shatzer and Powell arguably effect only
piecemeal changes in the law, poking holes in Miranda without giving the
police substantial room to undermine it, Thompkins is a different story. The
combined impact of the rulings in Thompkins enables the police to
administer Miranda warnings in a very quick, dismissive, bureaucratic way
and then launch immediately into the interrogation—unless and until the
suspect has the wherewithal to unequivocally invoke her rights. In so
holding, Thompkins deviates dramatically from Supreme Court precedent
and goes a long way towards undoing Miranda and reinstating the
voluntariness due process test Miranda sought to replace.

31
32
33
34
35
36

Id. at 1224–25.
Id.
Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1204–06.
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2259–60.
Id. at 2262–63.
Id. at 2263–64.
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To the extent Thompkins signals a change in the Court’s attitude
toward Miranda, it comes at a particularly critical time given recent
suggestions that Congress create an exception to Miranda for terrorism
suspects. While Dickerson may indicate that the Court would not look
favorably on such legislation, Thompkins may change that calculus. Some
preliminary thoughts on the implications of the Roberts Court’s rulings for
a terrorism exception to Miranda appear in the final piece of the Article.
II. MARYLAND V. SHATZER
In Maryland v. Shatzer, the Court created a break-in-custody exception
to Edwards v. Arizona, holding that a defendant who is released from
custody for a period of at least fourteen days loses the protection Edwards
provides to suspects who invoke the right to counsel. 37 The Shatzer Court
also decided that a prisoner “subject to a baseline set of restraints imposed
pursuant to a prior conviction” is not in custody for Miranda purposes. 38
Although the Court’s discussion of custody departed somewhat from
Supreme Court precedent, neither ruling deviated from the trend in the
lower court case law or a pragmatic approach to Miranda. Moreover, both
portions of the Court’s opinion showed some sensitivity to the interests of
criminal defendants and the policy goals underlying Miranda.
A. THE BREAK-IN-CUSTODY EXCEPTION

When Shatzer was initially questioned in connection with suspicions
that he had sexually abused his son, he invoked the Miranda right to
counsel. Consistent with the Court’s holding in Edwards v. Arizona that a
suspect who asserts the right to counsel “is not subject to further
interrogation . . . until counsel has been made available to him,” 39 the
interview ended. At the time, Shatzer was serving a prison term for an
unrelated sexual offense involving a different child. He was returned to the
general prison population for more than two and a half years until the police
uncovered further evidence implicating him in the abuse of his son. At that
point, a different officer returned to the prison and questioned Shatzer in a

37

Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1213 (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 47 (1981)).
Id. at 1224.
39
Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85. The Edwards rule was extended in Arizona v.
Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988), to apply even to good faith violations and also to prohibit
the police from asking the suspect even about a different crime. It was then extended still
further in Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990), to bar interrogation of a suspect who
requested counsel unless the attorney was present in the room, even if the suspect had
already been given an opportunity to consult with her.
38
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prison maintenance room. Prior to this second interrogation, Shatzer
received Miranda warnings and executed a written waiver. 40
In recognizing a break-in-custody exception to Edwards and therefore
finding that Shatzer’s Miranda rights had not been violated, Justice Scalia’s
opinion for the majority reasoned that a suspect who has “returned to his
normal life” between interrogation sessions does not remain “isolated” in a
police-dominated setting and “has likely been able to seek advice” from
others. 41 As a result, the Court believed there was “little reason to think”
that Shatzer’s “change of heart” was the result of police coercion, as
opposed to a decision on his part that “cooperating with the investigation
[was] in his interest.” 42 Turning next to the question when a break in
custody is “of sufficient duration to dissipate its coercive effects,” the Court
concluded that law enforcement’s need for “certainty” made it “impractical
to leave the answer to . . . future case-by-case adjudication” and drew the
line at fourteen days. 43 “It seems to us,” the Court opined, that two weeks
“provides plenty of time for the suspect to get reacclimated to his normal
life, to consult with friends and counsel, and to shake off any residual
coercive effects of his prior custody.” 44
Although Shatzer therefore cut back on the protections afforded
criminal defendants by Miranda and Edwards, the Court spoke largely in
one voice. None of the Justices would have suppressed Shatzer’s
confession, although Justice Stevens would have required a break in
40

See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1217–18.
Id. at 1221.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 1222–23.
44
Id. at 1228. But cf. id. at 1231 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (pointing out
that the majority provided “no reason for that speculation”); id. at 1228 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (calling the majority’s line “arbitrary”).
The record does not indicate precisely how the Court arrived at the fourteen-day limit.
Although the State of Maryland’s initial brief took the view that the Edwards protective
shield should disappear as soon as a suspect is released from custody, see Brief for Petitioner
at 21, Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (No. 08-680) (defending this position because it “establishes
a bright-line rule”), its reply brief suggested that the Court “properly may draw the line at the
point where badgering is unlikely to have occurred, be it the three days that were at issue in
Roberson and Minnick, three weeks, or the thirty days suggested by Amicus Curiae,
Criminal Justice Legal Foundation.” Reply Brief for Petitioner at 10, Shatzer, 130 S. Ct.
1213 (No. 08-680). As the State noted, one amicus brief proposed a thirty-day limit on the
grounds that “[a]n interrogation that took place 30 days ago is still fresh in the interrogator’s
and the defendant’s minds, . . . it is less likely that a new officer will be assigned to the same
investigation[, and] records are less likely to be misplaced.” Brief Amicus Curiae of the
Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioner at 19, Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213
(No. 08-680). At oral argument, the State then suggested a seven-day limit. See Transcript
of Oral Argument at 15, Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (No. 08-680). Until the Court issued its
opinion, then, there seems to have been no mention of a fourteen-day cutoff.
41
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custody longer than fourteen days before “treating the second interrogation
as no more coercive than the first.” 45 Justice Stevens was unwilling to
specify a fixed line, but he thought “a significant period of time” 46 was
needed to trigger a break-in-custody exception because a suspect who
invokes the right to counsel and then never sees the attorney he requested is
“likely to feel that the police lied to him or are ignoring his rights,”47 and
therefore that “‘further objection [is] futile and confession [is] the only way
to end his interrogation.’” 48
Not only was the Shatzer decision virtually unanimous, but it also
effected only an incremental change in the law. The break-in-custody
exception had been widely endorsed by the lower courts 49 and
foreshadowed in some of the Supreme Court’s own precedents. Although
the Court had never directly addressed the question 50 and some of its
opinions “could be read to suggest that the Edwards presumption, once

45

Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1234 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id.
47
Id. at 1234 n.15.
48
Id. at 1229 (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 473 (1994) (Souter, J.,
concurring in the judgment)); cf. Marcy Strauss, Reinterrogation, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
359, 401–02 (1995) (suggesting six months because a suspect whose “rights [are] respected
for six months . . . will likely not believe she is a victim of police badgering,” it is “highly
unlikely that the police will release a suspect for the sole purpose of breaking Edwards if
they must wait six months” before interrogating her, and half a year is “a significant enough
interval that at least it can be argued that some individuals might feel differently about
dealing with authority”).
49
See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1220 (noting that “[l]ower courts have uniformly held that a
break in custody ends the Edwards presumption”); Eugene L. Shapiro, Thinking the
Unthinkable: Recasting the Presumption of Edwards v. Arizona, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 11, 23 &
nn.90–91 (2000); Strauss, supra note 48, at 386.
50
More than fifteen years ago, the Court agreed to consider whether a defendant was still
entitled to the protection of Edwards even though five months had elapsed and he had
already pleaded guilty to the charge for which he requested counsel. The Court heard oral
argument in the case but then dismissed the cert petition when the prisoner died. See United
States v. Green, 507 U.S. 545 (1993).
46
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triggered, lasts forever,” 51 language in other decisions implied that the
Edwards protection applied only if the suspect was “still in custody.” 52
In addition to working only a piecemeal change in the law, the Shatzer
decision was consistent with a pragmatic approach to Miranda. The Court
reasoned that a break in custody was the “only logical endpoint” to
Edwards; otherwise, the Court feared, the Edwards ban on police
interrogation would essentially become “eternal.” 53 Given the Court’s
holdings in Arizona v. Roberson—that Edwards applies even when the
police wish to interrogate a suspect about a crime other than the one for
which she requested counsel and even in cases of inadvertent violations
(when the interrogating officer has no idea the suspect previously asserted
the right to counsel) 54—the Shatzer Court thought that law enforcement
officials would be severely hamstrung without a break-in-custody
exception. “In a country that harbors a large number of repeat offenders,”
the Court concluded, “this consequence is disastrous.” 55
At the same time, the Court was sensitive to Shatzer’s objection that
the position taken in a separate opinion written by Justice Thomas—that
suspects lose the protection of Edwards as soon as they are released from
custody 56—was easily subject to police manipulation. Justice Thomas’s
approach would allow law enforcement officials to engage in catch-andrelease tactics, repeatedly arresting a suspect, releasing her if she invoked

51
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13, Shatzer, 130
S. Ct. 1213 (No. 08-680) (citing Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990); Arizona
v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 680–82 (1988); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85
(1981)).
52
Roberson, 486 U.S. at 683 (“As a matter of law, the presumption raised by a suspect’s
request for counsel . . . does not disappear simply because the police have approached the
suspect, still in custody, still without counsel, about a separate investigation.”); see also
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177 (1991) (observing in dicta that a “suspect’s
statements are presumed involuntary” under Edwards “assuming there has been no break in
custody”); Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485 (“[I]t is inconsistent with Miranda and its progeny for
the authorities, at their instance, to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly
asserted his right to counsel.”).
53
Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1222. The Court declined to address the State’s alternative
suggestion that a “substantial lapse in time” in and of itself terminates a suspect’s protection
under Edwards. See id. at 1222 n.4.
54
Roberson, 486 U.S. at 682–85, 687 (“attach[ing] no significance” to the officer’s good
faith because “Edwards focuses on the state of mind of the suspect and not of the police” and
police “procedures . . . must enable an officer who proposes to initiate an interrogation to
determine whether the suspect has previously requested counsel”).
55
Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1222.
56
See id. at 1227–28 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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her Miranda rights, and then promptly re-arresting her. 57 The fourteen-day
window was designed, the majority said, to avoid such “police abuse.” 58
Even though the Court’s decision to support a break-in-custody
exception was consistent with a pragmatic approach to Miranda, there is
much to be said for the contrary view. During the initial interrogation
session, Shatzer was advised of his right to counsel and requested an
attorney, but he never actually got what he wanted.59 More important, once
a suspect is released from custody, she is not entitled to state-provided
counsel (assuming charges have not yet been filed).60 For those unable to
afford private lawyers, then, a fourteen-day break in custody does not
provide a meaningful opportunity to obtain legal advice. As the Court
noted in Arizona v. Roberson, “to a suspect who has indicated his inability
to cope with the pressures of custodial interrogation by requesting counsel,
any further interrogation without counsel having been provided will surely
exacerbate whatever compulsion to speak the suspect may be feeling.” 61
Although the Court obviously did not see it this way and its opinion
contained rhetoric belittling some of its precedents, the Shatzer decision
was not completely one-sided. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion did refer
snidely to Edwards as a “super-prophylactic rule,” 62 and also spoke of
“genuinely coerced” confessions 63—as contrasted with the merely

57

Cf. State v. Alley, 841 A.2d 803, 809–10 (Me. 2004) (finding that suspect had “a
reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney” even though he was released at 2:35 p.m. and
had only a six-hour break in custody).
58
Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1223.
59
Cf. Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in Light of Contemporary
Law and Understandings, 90 MINN. L. REV. 781, 797, 804 (2006) (arguing that the “Miranda
right to counsel is in reality an empty promise” given that “[f]orty years of experience” has
shown that in “the vast majority” of cases where a suspect asserts the right to counsel, “no
attorney is provided”).
60
Miranda and its right to counsel do not protect one who is no longer in custody, see
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966), and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is
not triggered until “adversary judicial proceedings” have begun. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682, 688–89 (1972) (requiring a “formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
information, or arraignment”).
61
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 686 (1988); see also Strauss, supra note 48, at 392
(arguing that a break in custody is “unrelated to the notion of voluntariness in the sense of
implementing the suspect’s choice to deal with the authorities only through counsel”).
62
Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1221 n.3; see also id. at 1219, 1220 (calling Edwards a “‘second
layer of prophylaxis’” as opposed to “a constitutional mandate”) (quoting McNeil v.
Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176 (1991)).
63
Id. at 1221; see also id. at 1222 (referring to “in-fact voluntary confessions”).
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presumptively coerced confessions violative of Miranda. 64 Additionally,
the Court subjected Edwards to the seemingly omnipresent balancing test
applied the previous Term in a Sixth Amendment confession case, 65
warning of the costs occasioned by Edwards in terms of “voluntary
confessions it excludes from trial” and cautioning that “[t]he Edwards
presumption of involuntariness is justified only in circumstances where . . .
suspects’ waivers of Miranda rights are likely to be involuntary most of the
time.” 66
On the other hand, the Court made the significant announcement that
once a suspect asserts the right to counsel, Edwards prevents the police
even from inquiring whether she has changed her mind and is now willing
to talk to them without a lawyer. Language in prior Supreme Court

64

See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985) (“A Miranda violation does not
constitute coercion but rather affords a bright-line, legal presumption of coercion, requiring
suppression of all unwarned statements.”); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654–55 &
n.5 (1984) (distinguishing confessions that are “actually compelled” from those that are
“presumed compelled because of [the] failure to read . . . Miranda warnings”).
65
See Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2089 (2009) (“When this Court creates a
prophylactic rule in order to protect a constitutional right, the relevant ‘reasoning’ is the
weighing of the rule’s benefits against its costs.”).
66
Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1222, 1226 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1220 (observing
that “[a] judicially crafted rule is ‘justified only by reference to its prophylactic purpose,’
and applies only where its benefits outweigh its costs”) (quoting Davis v. United States, 512
U.S. 452, 458 (1994)); id. at 1221 (noting that “[t]he ‘justification for a conclusive
presumption disappears when application of the presumption will not reach the correct result
most of the time’”) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 737 (1991)). These cases
thus import into the confessions arena the same “freewheeling” balancing approach
prevalent in the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Carol S. Steiker, Second
Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 855 (1994); see also, e.g., Anthony
G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 393–94
(1974) (criticizing the “sliding scale approach” because it “converts” the law into “one
immense Rorschach blot,” which can “only produce more slide than scale [and] means in
practice . . . that appellate courts defer to trial courts and trial courts defer to the police”).
For the view that the Fourth Amendment’s balancing test has no place in interpreting the
Fifth Amendment’s absolute prohibition of compelled self-incrimination, see, for example,
Quarles, 467 U.S. at 687–88 & n.10 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Geoffrey R. Stone, The
Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 S. CT. REV. 99, 110–11; Charles D.
Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 170–73 (1998).
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opinions had fluctuated between that position67 and the more prosecutionfriendly view that Edwards only prohibits the police from engaging in
conduct that rises to the level of “interrogation” for purposes of Miranda. 68
Resolving the divisions that these conflicting signals had generated in the
lower courts, the Shatzer majority observed that Edwards bars even
“subsequent requests for interrogation.” 69 Otherwise, the Court pointed out,
police officers will be able to “take advantage of the mounting coercive
pressures of ‘prolonged police custody’” 70 by making multiple attempts to
question a suspect who invoked the right to counsel until she is “‘badgered
into submission.’” 71 Later in the opinion, the Court likewise described
Edwards as “prevent[ing] any efforts to get [the suspect] to change his
mind.” 72 Lest there be any doubt, the Court then criticized Justice
Stevens’s concurrence for speaking in terms of “‘reinterrogat[ing]’” a
suspect: the “fallacy” of Justice Stevens’s argument, the majority noted, “is
that we are not talking about ‘reinterrogating’ the suspect; we are talking

67

See Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2090 (summarizing Edwards as providing that once a
suspect asserts the right to counsel, “not only must the immediate contact end, but
‘badgering’ by later requests is prohibited”); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176–77
(1991) (observing that a suspect who has invoked the right to counsel “may not be
approached for further interrogation” and the police may not “subsequently initiate an
encounter in the absence of counsel”); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988)
(noting that “any subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities’ behest, and not at the
suspect’s own instigation, is itself the product of the ‘inherently compelling pressures’ and
not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect”) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
467 (1966)).
68
See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981) (holding that a suspect who
invokes counsel “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has
been made available to him”); see also Roberson, 486 U.S. at 686 (“[T]o a suspect who has
indicated his inability to cope with the pressures of custodial interrogation by requesting
counsel, any further interrogation without counsel having been provided will surely
exacerbate whatever compulsion to speak the suspect may be feeling.”); Smith v. Illinois,
469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984) (per curiam) (observing that “Edwards set forth a ‘bright-line rule’
that all questioning must cease after an accused requests counsel”) (quoting Solem v.
Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 646–47 (1984)); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 (1983)
(plurality opinion) (discussing the steps police must take “before a suspect in custody can be
subjected to further interrogation after he requests an attorney”).
69
Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1220. See generally 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL,
NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.9(f), at 845–47 (3d ed. 2007)
(citing conflicting lower court rulings on this issue).
70
Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1220 (quoting Roberson, 486 U.S. at 686).
71
Id. (quoting Roberson, 486 U.S. at 690 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
72
Id. at 1225 n.8; see also id. at 1221 (noting that after a break in custody, “it is far
fetched to think that a police officer’s asking the suspect whether he would like to waive his
Miranda rights will any more ‘wear down the accused’ than did the first such request”)
(quoting Smith, 469 U.S. at 98) (emphasis added).
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about asking his permission to be interrogated.” 73 This is clearly a broader
reading of the Edwards line of cases than the view that police do not violate
the Miranda rights of a suspect who has asserted the right to counsel unless
their conduct constitutes “interrogation” as defined in Rhode Island v.
Innis. 74
Thus, the Court’s decision to endorse a break-in-custody exception to
Edwards did not make a fundamental change in the law and was defensible
on pragmatic grounds. Moreover, the opinion was somewhat balanced,
even though it did seem to pull an unduly abbreviated fourteen-day cutoff
out of thin air.
B. PRISONERS IN CUSTODY

After determining that Edwards’s protective umbrella closes after a
break in custody of at least fourteen days, the Court went on to determine
that Shatzer in fact enjoyed such a break from custody when, after the first
interrogation session ended with his assertion of the right to counsel, he was
“released back into the general prison population where he was serving an
unrelated sentence.” 75 In so holding, the Court reasoned that inmates like
Shatzer “live in prison” and “return to their accustomed surroundings and
daily routine” rather than remaining “isolated with their accusers.” 76
Although Justice Scalia’s majority opinion stressed that it was not
“minimizing the harsh realities of incarceration,” it pointed out that
prisoners who rejoin the general prison population “regain the degree of
control they had over their lives prior to the interrogation,” including, in
Shatzer’s case, access to a prison library, mail, recreation, educational and
training programs, and visitors. 77 Finally, the Court explained that, unlike a
suspect in “interrogative custody,” the restrictions on Shatzer’s freedom did
not “rest[] with those controlling the[] interrogation,” as his questioners had
“no power to increase the duration of [his] incarceration.” 78

73
Id. at 1225 (quoting Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1229 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment)). Likewise, at oral argument, Justice Scalia asked the State’s attorney: “I thought
that you couldn’t approach him. I thought that once he’s invoked his right to counsel, you
can’t approach him and say, would you like to talk now? Right? Isn’t that . . . the rule?”
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 44, at 26.
74
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01 (1980) (defining interrogation as “express
questioning or its functional equivalent,” i.e., “any words or actions on the part of the
police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response”).
75
Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1224.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 1225 & n.8.
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Although the Supreme Court’s conclusion coincided with that reached
by numerous lower courts, 79 the Court was somewhat disingenuous in
discussing its own precedents and claiming that it had “explicitly declined
to address” this question on prior occasions.80 In support of this
proposition, the Court cited Illinois v. Perkins, which held that a suspect
being questioned by an undercover informant is not entitled to Miranda
warnings because the requisite “‘interplay’” between custody and
interrogation is missing. 81 Specifically, the Shatzer Court relied on a
parenthetical in Perkins that came at the end of a paragraph discussing the
Court’s prior decision in Mathis v. United States. 82 In that parenthetical, the
Perkins Court left open whether “the bare fact of custody” necessarily
requires Miranda warnings “even when the suspect is aware that he is
speaking to [a government] official.” 83 But the Court did not deny that
Perkins—who was imprisoned pending trial on another charge—was in
custody for purposes of Miranda. In fact, the Court acknowledged that he
was “in custody in a technical sense,” but criticized the state court for
“mistakenly assum[ing] that because [he] was in custody, no undercover
questioning could take place.” 84
Moreover, the Shatzer majority itself did not even cite Mathis, the
Supreme Court precedent most on point. 85 In that case, the Court held that
an inmate serving a state prison sentence was entitled to Miranda warnings
during a jailhouse interview with an IRS agent conducting a tax fraud
investigation. 86 Although the finding that Mathis should have been read his
Miranda rights signifies that he must have been in custody, the Court’s
brief discussion focused on rejecting the Government’s argument that
Mathis was not in custody because he had been put in prison by other law
enforcement officials for a different offense.87 Admittedly, the Court’s
79

See Laurie Magid, Questioning the Question-Proof Inmate: Defining Miranda Custody
for Incarcerated Suspects, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 883, 935–39 (1997).
80
Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1224.
81
Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990) (quoting Yale Kamisar, Brewer v.
Williams, Massiah and Miranda: What Is “Interrogation”? When Does It Matter?, 67 GEO.
L.J. 1, 63 (1978)).
82
Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
83
Perkins, 496 U.S. at 299, cited in Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1224.
84
Perkins, 496 U.S. at 297 (emphasis added); see also id. at 300 n.* (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (noting that the case might well have come out differently if
Perkins had previously asserted his right to counsel given that he was “in custody on an
unrelated charge when he was questioned”).
85
Only Justice Stevens’s separate opinion cited Mathis. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1232 n.12
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
86
See Mathis, 391 U.S. at 2–3.
87
See id. at 5 (finding “the reason why the person is in custody” irrelevant for purposes
of Miranda).
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attention in Mathis was directed at the defendant’s status at the time he was
being questioned (and the Court did not deny that Shatzer was in custody
during both interviews). 88 Furthermore, the majority of lower courts have
interpreted Mathis as requiring “some restraint additional to those usually
imposed upon [a suspect] as an inmate.” 89 But in finding that Mathis was
entitled to Miranda warnings, the Supreme Court did not rely on any
particular “restraints” placed on him during the interview. In fact, the
Court’s decision did not describe the interrogation session at all; the only
detail that can be gleaned from the opinion is that the same IRS agent
questioned Mathis twice somewhere in the prison where he was serving his
sentence. Additionally, the Mathis majority obviously rejected the Shatzerlike argument Justice White made in dissent—that Mathis was not in
custody because he was in “familiar surroundings” and therefore was no
different from an individual being questioned at home or in an IRS office.90
Therefore, despite the fact that Perkins gratuitously seemed to cast doubt on
Mathis, there is at least some tension between the Court’s decision in the
latter case and the result in Shatzer, which the Court made no effort to
reconcile.
After citing the Perkins parenthetical (and ignoring Mathis), the
Shatzer Court went on to acknowledge that “all forms of incarceration” 91
satisfy the definition of custody originally set out in California v. Beheler
and Oregon v. Mathiason—which asks whether the suspect was subjected
to “‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree
associated with a formal arrest.” 92 Nonetheless, the Shatzer Court
continued, its precedents indicated that “the freedom-of-movement test
identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda
custody.” 93 But the Court’s only support here was Berkemer v. McCarty,
which held that a suspect is not in custody for purposes of Miranda simply
because she has been subjected to a traffic or Terry stop. 94 Despite the

88

See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1224.
Magid, supra note 79, at 942; cf. 2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 69, § 6.6(b), at 724
(calling this “‘a unique body of caselaw’”) (quoting State v. Conley, 574 N.W.2d 569, 573
(N.D. 1998)).
90
Mathis, 391 U.S. at 7 (White, J., dissenting).
91
Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1224.
92
California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429
U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).
93
Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1224.
94
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984).
89
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linguistic similarities between the definitions of custody 95 and Terry stops, 96
Berkemer explained that, while a stop constitutes a Fourth Amendment
“seizure,” it does not rise to the level of Miranda custody because it usually
does not last long and takes place in public rather than a police-dominated
atmosphere. 97 Neither of these is a particularly apt description of
incarceration, however, and therefore it is not obvious how Berkemer
supported the Shatzer Court’s efforts to distinguish Beheler and Mathiason
and thereby avoid the conclusion that Shatzer in fact was continuously in
custody under the definition set out in those two cases.
Although the Court’s determination that Shatzer was not in custody
extended Supreme Court precedent, it was consistent with the Court’s
pragmatic approach to Miranda. A holding that inmates serving their
sentences are perpetually in custody for purposes of Miranda would require
prison guards to provide warnings before asking any incriminating
questions, thus making prisoners permanently “question-proof.” 98 In the
words of the Ninth Circuit, the result would be to “torture [Miranda] to the
illogical position of providing greater protection to a prisoner than to his
nonimprisoned counterpart.” 99
Nevertheless, the Court could easily have defended a contrary
conclusion. Even the majority did not deny that, as Justice Stevens put it,
Shatzer’s “entire life remain[ed] subject to government control.” 100
Moreover, in explaining why Perkins was not entitled to Miranda warnings,
the Court in that case expressed doubt that a prisoner being questioned by

95
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that warnings must be
given to one who “has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way”); see also Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442 (indicating that the
definition of custody turns on the perspective of “a reasonable man in the suspect’s
position”).
96
See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983) (plurality opinion) (defining a stop as a
situation where “‘a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave’”)
(quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.)).
Interestingly, the Court has used the Fourth Amendment “free to leave” language in
explaining the concept of Miranda custody. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 659
(2004); id. at 669 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 669–70 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For an
analysis of Alvarado’s discussion of custody, see Kit Kinports, Criminal Procedure in
Perspective, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 71, 133–43 (2007).
97
See Berkemer, 486 U.S. at 436–39.
98
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 44, at 22.
99
Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir. 1978); see also United States v.
Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1985) (agreeing that a conclusion that prisoners are
always in custody “would seriously disrupt prison administration” given the “myriad
informal conversations between inmates and prison guards”).
100
Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1232 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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an undercover informant would “feel compelled to speak by the fear of
reprisal for remaining silent or in the hope of more lenient treatment should
he confess.” 101 Shatzer’s situation is readily distinguishable from Perkins,
however. Inmates serving prison terms are accustomed to receiving orders
from government personnel and understand the consequences of disobeying
them. Additionally, even though the detectives who questioned Shatzer
may have had “no apparent power to decrease the time served,”102 that does
not mean that Shatzer’s cooperation (or lack thereof) would play no role in
determining his eligibility for parole.103 Certainly, he might reasonably
have feared that it could play such a role—an important consideration given
that the definition of custody focuses on how a reasonable person “in the
suspect’s position would have understood his situation.” 104 And while the
majority tried to distinguish Shatzer from the rest of the Edwards line of
cases on the grounds that the latter group of defendants “confronted the
uncertainties of what final charges they would face, whether they would be
convicted, and what sentence they would receive,” Shatzer faced those
same “uncertainties” with respect to the charges involving his son that were
the subject of the two interrogations. 105
Although the Court could therefore have justified a different outcome,
Shatzer’s discussion of custody, like its break-in-custody holding, was not
completely one-sided. The Court acknowledged that Shatzer was in
custody during both prison interviews, drawing a line between
“interrogative custody” and “incarceration” 106 (or what some call
“correctional custody” 107). While any other conclusion would have been
difficult to reconcile with Mathis, inmates like Shatzer “live in prison,”108
101

Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990); see also id. at 297 (“Questioning by
captors, who appear to control the suspect’s fate, may create mutually reinforcing pressures
that the Court has assumed will weaken the suspect’s will.”).
102
Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1225.
103
See id. at 1233 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that “cooperation
frequently is relevant to whether the prisoner can obtain parole,” and “even if . . . a
prisoner’s fate is not controlled by the police who come to interrogate him, how is the
prisoner supposed to know that?”); MD. CODE REGS tit. 12.08.01.18(A)(3) (2010) (taking
into account “[t]he offender’s behavior and adjustment” as well as her “current attitude
toward society, discipline, and other authority” in determining eligibility for parole).
104
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984) (observing that this is “the only
relevant inquiry”); see also Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663 (2004) (inquiring
“‘how a reasonable person in the position of the individual being questioned would gauge
the breadth of his or her freedom of action’”) (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318,
325 (1994) (per curiam)).
105
Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1225.
106
Id. at 1225 n.8.
107
United States v. Arrington, 215 F.3d 855, 856 (8th Cir. 2000).
108
Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1224.
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and typically interviews in one’s home are not custodial. 109 Shatzer’s
second interrogation, which took place in a prison maintenance room, lasted
only about half an hour, the detective was not armed, and Shatzer was not
placed in handcuffs. 110 Nevertheless, the Court considered only the
location and length of the meeting important enough even to mention and
stated unequivocally that “a prisoner [who] is removed from the general
prison population and taken to a separate location for questioning” is in
custody. 111
On balance, then, both rulings in Shatzer reflected some sensitivity to
the interests Miranda was designed to protect. Although the decision that
prisoners are not continuously in custody constituted a more significant
departure from Supreme Court precedent, neither that holding nor the
break-in-custody exception deviated substantially from the lower court case
law or the Court’s pragmatic approach to Miranda.
III. FLORIDA V. POWELL
In Florida v. Powell, 112 decided the day before Shatzer, the Supreme
Court found that Miranda’s requirement that suspects be “clearly informed”
of the right to the presence of counsel “during interrogation”113 was
satisfied even though Powell was never explicitly told that an attorney
could be with him in the interrogation room. Powell was arrested in
Tampa, Florida, and pursuant to the standard Miranda waiver form used by
that city’s police department, was first advised that he had “the right to talk
to a lawyer before answering any of our questions” and that, if he could not
109
See 2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 69, § 6.6(e), at 738–40. But cf. Orozco v. Texas,
394 U.S. 324, 326–27 (1969) (finding that suspect who was questioned by four police
officers in his bedroom at 4:00 a.m. was in custody).
110
See Brief for the United States, supra note 51, at 2.
111
Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1225 n.8; see also id. at 1224 (noting that “[n]o one questions”
this fact). But cf. Magid, supra note 79, at 944 (reporting that many lower courts consider
the following factors in determining whether a prison interview is custodial: “(1) the
physical surroundings of the interrogation; (2) the language used to summon the inmate; (3)
the extent to which he is confronted with evidence of his guilt; and (4) any additional
pressure exerted to detain him such that there is a ‘restriction of his freedom over and above
that in his normal prison setting’”) (quoting Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 428 (9th Cir.
1978)). See generally 2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 69, § 6.6(c), at 729 (pointing out that
custody determinations often depend on the totality of the circumstances).
112
130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010).
113
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966). The Court has frequently reiterated
that Miranda contemplates the right to the presence of counsel in the interrogation room.
See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2085 (2009) (“during interrogation”); Iowa
v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 89 (2004) (“during questioning”); Davis v. United States, 512 U.S.
452, 457 (1994) (“during questioning”); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 154 (1990)
(“at custodial interrogation”).
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afford an attorney, one would be appointed “before any questioning.” 114 He
was then told that he had “the right to use any of these rights at any time
you want during this interview.” 115
In concluding that this information “reasonably conveyed” Powell’s
right to have counsel present during interrogation, Justice Ginsburg’s
opinion for the Court acknowledged that the warnings given Powell were
“not the clearest possible formulation,” but nevertheless concluded that they
were “sufficiently comprehensive and comprehensible when given a
commonsense reading.” 116 The majority reasoned that “[t]he first statement
communicated that Powell could consult with a lawyer before answering
any particular question, and the second statement confirmed that he could
exercise that right while the interrogation was underway.”117 “In
combination,” the Court explained, “the two warnings reasonably conveyed
Powell’s right to have an attorney present, not only at the outset of
interrogation, but at all times.” 118
Like Shatzer, the Court’s decision here was not particularly divisive:
Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion was joined only by Justice Breyer. The
dissenters disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of the warnings given
to Powell, taking the position that “[a]n intelligent suspect could reasonably
conclude” he was entitled only to “a one-time right to consult with an
attorney” rather than a right to have the lawyer “present with him in the
interrogation room at all times.” 119
Although the Court was not deeply split, Powell effected a more
dramatic change in the law than Shatzer. The Powell majority did not
mention the lower courts’ treatment of this issue, but in fact it had
generated more of a conflict than either of the questions before the Court in
Shatzer. Some courts took the position that suspects must expressly be told
that the right to counsel extends to the interrogation room, and even those
that adopted a contrary view typically approved warnings that spoke
generally about the “right to counsel” without suggesting any limitation or
making any reference to timing. Only a handful of courts had upheld

114

Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1200 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added). The complete waiver form read as follows: “You have the right
to remain silent. If you give up the right to remain silent, anything you say can be used
against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of our
questions. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed for you without cost
and before any questioning. You have the right to use any of these rights at any time you
want during this interview.” Id.
116
Id. at 1205 (emphasis omitted).
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 1212 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115
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warnings like the one given Powell that could be interpreted as applying
only before interrogation. 120
Powell may not have referenced the current state of the lower court
case law, but the Court did discuss in detail its own precedent, claiming that
California v. Prysock 121 and Duckworth v. Eagan 122 “inform our judgment
here.” 123 In each of those prior cases, the Powell majority explained, the
Court had refused to “dictate[] the words” police use in communicating
Miranda warnings. 124 Moreover, those were the two opinions in which
Miranda’s requirement that suspects must be “clearly informed” 125 of their
rights was first interpreted (in Prysock) to mean “fully conveyed,” 126 and
then later (in Duckworth) was amended to the less rigorous “reasonably
‘convey’” standard 127 ultimately applied in Powell. 128
The Powell opinion did not tread new ground, then, in terms of the
legal standard it applied. Nevertheless, as the Court acknowledged, the
suspects in each of the earlier cases were expressly advised of their right to
have an attorney present during interrogation,129 and both opinions made
clear that the suspects were entitled to that information. 130 The challenges
120

See id. at 1211–12; Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 18–21, Florida v. Powell, 130
S. Ct. 1195 (2010) (No. 08-1175); Brief for Respondent at 28–37, Florida v. Powell, 130 S.
Ct. 1195 (2010) (No. 08-1175); Adam S. Bazelon, Comment, Adding (or Reaffirming) a
Temporal Element to the Miranda Warning “You Have the Right to an Attorney,” 90 MARQ.
L. REV. 1009, 1019–20 (2007); Daria K. Boxer, Comment, Miranda with Precision: Why the
Current Circuit Split Should Be Solved in Favor of a Uniform Requirement of an Explicit
Miranda Warning of the Right to Have Counsel Present During Interrogation, 37 SW. U. L.
REV. 425, 432–36 (2008).
121
453 U.S. 355 (1981) (per curiam).
122
492 U.S. 195 (1989).
123
Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1204.
124
Id.; see also Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 202 (“We have never insisted that Miranda
warnings be given in the exact form described in that decision.”); Prysock, 453 U.S. at 359
(noting that Miranda “indicated that no talismanic incantation was required to satisfy its
strictures”).
125
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966).
126
Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361.
127
Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203 (quoting Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361); see also Jeff L’Hote,
Note, Duckworth v. Eagan: A Semantical Debate or the Continuing Debasement of
Miranda?, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 1267, 1290 n.186 (1990) (pointing out that Duckworth
“cavalierly substitutes the word ‘reasonably’ for the Prysock Court’s ‘fully’”).
128
Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1204.
129
See id. (citing Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 198; Prysock, 453 U.S. at 356–57).
130
See Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 204 (noting that Miranda mandates that “the suspect be
informed, as here, that he has the right to an attorney before and during questioning”);
Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361 (observing that “‘[this] is not a case in which the defendant was not
informed of his right to the presence of an attorney during questioning . . . or in which the
offer of an appointed attorney was associated with a future time in court’”) (quoting United
States v. Noa, 443 F.2d 144, 146 (9th Cir. 1971)).
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in those two cases were instead linked to additional information provided
by the police during the administration of Miranda warnings.
In Prysock, for example, the suspect was informed of his right to “talk
to a lawyer before you are questioned” and to have the attorney “present
with you while you are being questioned, and all during the questioning.” 131
In addition, he was advised that he had “the right to have a lawyer
appointed to represent you at no cost to yourself.” 132 As the Powell Court
rightly pointed out, the Prysock opinion was critical of the California Court
of Appeal for also requiring “an express statement that the appointment of
an attorney would occur prior to the impending interrogation.”133 But that
language does not necessarily indicate that the Prysock Court would have
approved the version of the warnings given in Powell. First, despite that
criticism, most of the Prysock Court’s attention was focused elsewhere.
Much of the Prysock opinion was devoted to correcting a more basic
misstep the state appellate court made by “essentially la[ying] down a flat
rule” mandating that Miranda warnings must be “a virtual incantation of the
precise language contained in the Miranda opinion.”134
Second, Powell’s complaint involved a more fundamental error.
Prysock, unlike Powell, was explicitly told not only that he could consult a
lawyer prior to interrogation but also that he had the right to have the
attorney accompany him into the interrogation room. Furthermore, the
basis of the California court’s determination that Prysock had not been
adequately informed of his right to appointed counsel was “simply . . . the
order in which [the warnings] were given” 135—the police had made a
“‘needless excursion’” between describing the right to counsel and the right
to appointed counsel into a discussion of Prysock’s right to have his parents
present during the interrogation.136 Thus, the Supreme Court was able to
conclude in Prysock that “nothing in the warnings . . . suggested any
limitation on the right to the presence of appointed counsel,” and the Court
expressly distinguished cases where “the reference to appointed counsel

131

Prysock, 453 U.S. at 356 (emphasis added).
Id. at 357.
133
Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1204 (emphasis added) (citing Prysock’s observation, 453 U.S.
at 358–59, that the state appellate court disapproved of the warnings given there because
Prysock “was not explicitly informed of his right to have an attorney appointed before
further questioning”).
134
Prysock, 453 U.S. at 355.
135
Id. at 361.
136
Id. at 364 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting the California Court of Appeal
opinion).
132
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was linked with some future point in time after police interrogation.” 137 In
Powell, by contrast, the conclusion that no timing restriction was placed on
the right to counsel is much harder to reach.
Likewise, in Duckworth the suspect was told that he had “a right to
talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, and to have
him with you during questioning,” and that “this right to the advice and
presence of a lawyer” applied “even if you cannot afford to hire one.” 138
The Supreme Court concluded that the police thereby “touched all of the
bases required by Miranda.” 139 The fact that the police additionally
informed Eagan, “[w]e have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be
appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court” did not, in the
Court’s mind, undermine the validity of the warnings. 140 This extra
statement “accurately described” the practice in Indiana, the Court
explained, and “simply anticipate[d]” what the Court thought “must be [a]
relatively commonplace” question.141 Thus, as the Powell dissenters
pointed out, in both Prysock and Duckworth the police “added additional,
truthful information” that was “arguably misleading,” whereas in Powell
the warnings actually “omit[ted] one of a suspect’s rights.”142
Though the ruling in Powell therefore extended the Supreme Court’s
precedents and made more than an incremental change in the law, the Court
attempted to defend it on the pragmatic ground that police should be
permitted to use “[d]ifferent words” in administering Miranda so long as
they “communicated the same essential message.”143 The Duckworth Court
137
Id. at 360–61 (majority opinion); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 484
(1966) (describing as “consistent with the procedure which we delineate today” the FBI
warnings in use at that time, which referred generally to “a right to counsel” without
specifying that the right applied during interrogation or suggesting any limits on the timing
of the right).
138
Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 198 (1989) (emphasis added). Eagan was also
informed that he had “the right to stop answering at any time until you’ve talked to a
lawyer.” Id. For further discussion of this warning, see infra notes 350–54 and
accompanying text.
139
Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203.
140
Id. at 198.
141
Id. at 204. But cf. Yale Kamisar, Duckworth v. Eagan: A Little-Noticed Miranda
Case That May Cause Much Mischief, 25 CRIM. L. BULL. 550, 552 (1989) (concluding that
the Court’s decision “dealt Miranda a heavy blow”); George C. Thomas III, Separated at
Birth but Siblings Nonetheless: Miranda and the Due Process Notice Cases, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 1081, 1107–08 (2001) (observing that “if the principal function of [Miranda] warnings
is to dispel the inherent compulsion of police interrogation, the warnings in Duckworth don’t
seem particularly well fitted for the job” because they “seem to promise an appointed lawyer
only if the suspect is arraigned at some later time”).
142
Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1212 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143
Id. at 1206 (majority opinion); see also id. (refusing to find a “precise formulation
necessary to meet Miranda’s requirements”).
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similarly expressed reluctance to suppress a confession simply because the
police deviated slightly from the wording suggested in Miranda for fear that
law enforcement personnel “may not always have access to [a] printed
Miranda warning[], or . . . may inadvertently depart from [their] routine.”144
Consistent with common practice today, however, 145 the warnings given to
Powell were read from a printed form, 146 thus mitigating the Court’s
pragmatic concerns.
Moreover, the decision in Powell creates an opportunity for police
departments to circumvent Miranda by adopting waiver forms that are
misleading and require suspects to read between the lines in order to
understand their rights. The Powell Court responded to the argument that
its decision gives law enforcement an incentive “to end-run Miranda by
amending their warnings to introduce ambiguity” by echoing the Solicitor
General’s underwhelming assertion that the police “‘have little reason to
assume the litigation risk of experimenting with novel Miranda
formulations.’” 147 The Court might have a point with respect to “novel”
ways of tinkering with Miranda’s language, but Powell certainly opens the
door for other police departments to adopt the Tampa waiver form approved
by the Court. And while the State maintained that there was no flurry of
movement following Duckworth to use the specific “if and when you go to
court” language upheld in that case,148 the Court’s decision in Duckworth
did generally lead to “an unconstrained proliferation of warnings.” 149
In fact, there was some discussion before the Supreme Court
concerning the reasons motivating the Tampa Police Department to adopt
the particular wording at issue in Powell—especially given that an earlier
version of the Tampa waiver form (like those in use in the “vast majority”
of police departments elsewhere in Florida 150) unambiguously explained
that the right to counsel applied “prior to or during” interrogation.151 The
144
145

Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203.
See 2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 69, § 6.5(c), at 708; Godsey, supra note 59, at 807

n.101.
146

See Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1200.
Id. at 1206 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 6, Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (No. 08-1175)).
148
See Reply Brief of Petitioner at 24, Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (No. 08-1175).
149
Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1590 (2008).
150
Rigterink v. State, 2 So. 3d 221, 254 (Fla. 2009); see also Roberts v. State, 874 So. 2d
1225, 1227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (observing that the vast majority of waiver forms used
in Florida included language indicating that the suspect “is entitled to an attorney during
questioning, or words to that effect”).
151
Thompson v. State, 595 So. 2d 16, 17 (Fla. 1992) (“‘I further understand that prior to
or during this interview that I have the right to have an attorney present.’”) (quoting Tampa
Police Department Form 310 (1984)).
147
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State claimed that the new form was “apparently adopted as a result of
litigation” culminating in a Florida Supreme Court decision disapproving of
the prior warning. 152 But that state supreme court opinion invalidated an
entirely different portion of the Tampa waiver form, on the theory that it did
not sufficiently inform suspects of the right to have an attorney “at no
cost.” 153 As Professor Richard Leo noted, “[w]hile the record does not
firmly establish the Tampa Police Department’s motives” for amending its
waiver form, “empirical research demonstrating that law enforcement often
manipulates its interrogation strategies to undermine Miranda casts doubt
upon the Solicitor General’s presumption that there is some innocuous
explanation for the change.” 154
In addition, Powell cannot be defended on the pragmatic ground that it
avoids disrupting law enforcement practices nationwide. In fact, the
version of the warnings the Tampa police came up with was something of
an outlier; surveys show that the overwhelming majority of police
departments expressly inform suspects they have the right to have an
attorney present during the interrogation session.155 Moreover, adding the
four words “and during the interview” to the sentence “You have the right
to talk to a lawyer before answering any of our questions” is a minor and
easily implemented change that would not add appreciably to the length or
complexity of the Tampa waiver form. 156 And it does not run afoul of the
Court’s pragmatic reluctance to insist on “rigidity in the form of the
required warnings”: 157 the warning could be phrased in multiple other ways,
for example, “and while we are chatting,” “and in the interrogation room,”
etc.
152

Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 148, at 26 n.11.
Thompson, 595 So. 2d at 18. The contested part of the earlier warning form provided:
“‘I further understand that if I am unable to hire an attorney and I desire to consult with an
attorney or have one present during this interview that I may do so and this interview will
terminate.’” Id. at 17 (quoting Tampa Police Department Form 310 (1984)) (emphasis
omitted).
154
Brief for Professor Richard A. Leo as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 16,
Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (No. 08-1175); see also id. at 17 (noting that a Tampa Police
Department Legal Bulletin from June 2009 “outlined several techniques that officers could
use to minimize the chance that a suspect will invoke his right to counsel”).
155
See Richard Rogers et al., The Language of Miranda Warnings in American
Jurisdictions: A Replication and Vocabulary Analysis, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 124, 133
(2008) (surveying Miranda warnings given in almost 950 jurisdictions nationwide and
reporting that more than 95% included language informing suspects of the right to counsel
“during questioning” or “before and during questioning”).
156
Cf. Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 148, at 26 n.11 (defending the waiver form
read to Powell on the grounds that it was “substantially less complex,” shorter, and less
“arcane” and “legalistic” than the previous form in use in Tampa).
157
California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981).
153
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Not only is the result in Powell hard to defend on pragmatic grounds,
but this case, just like Shatzer, could easily have been decided in the
defendant’s favor. Miranda was based on the fundamental premise that
safeguards are needed to “dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial
surroundings.” 158 Given the anxiety and disorientation suspects feel as a
result of that coerciveness, empirical research suggests they often do not
really comprehend the information Miranda mandates that they be given. 159
Any imprecision, ambiguity, or internal inconsistency in the language used
by the police cannot help but diminish even further their level of
understanding.
Moreover, the majority’s interpretation of the warning given to Powell
was not the only plausible construction of the Tampa waiver form. The
police specifically informed Powell that he had the right to “talk to a lawyer
before answering any of our questions” and, if he did not have the funds to
hire an attorney, one would be appointed for him “without cost and before
The Supreme Court read those sentences as
any questioning.” 160
“communicat[ing] that Powell could consult with a lawyer before
answering any particular question.” 161 But they could also refer, as the
state courts believed, to the time period prior to the onset of the
interrogation session. 162 The Powell majority also asserted that this
language “merely conveyed when Powell’s right to an attorney became
effective”—i.e., “before he answered any questions at all”—and did not
“indicate[] that counsel’s presence would be restricted after the questioning
Again, however, that is not the only defensible
commenced.” 163
interpretation. Arguably, this portion of the warnings expressly linked the
158

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966); see also Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1203
(noting that Miranda’s right to counsel “addresses our particular concern that ‘[t]he
circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the
will of one merely made aware of his privilege [to remain silent]’”) (quoting Miranda, 384
U.S. at 469).
159
See, e.g., Rogers et al., supra note 155, at 129 (reporting that less than one percent of
Miranda warnings “can be understood with a 5th grade reading level” and “[t]he large
majority . . . require at least a 7th grade reading comprehension,” and concluding that “[i]n
light of widespread illiteracy among correctional populations, this finding is crucial”);
Weisselberg, supra note 149, at 1577 (finding that “many warnings demand a greater
educational background than many suspects possess” and often suspects are “substantially
impaired with respect to their ability to understand their Miranda rights”).
160
Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1200 (2010) (emphasis added).
161
Id. at 1205 (emphasis added).
162
See State v. Powell, 998 So. 2d 531, 540 (Fla. 2008) (commenting that “the right . . .
to talk with a lawyer before answering questions . . . is not the functional equivalent of
having the lawyer present with you during questioning”); Powell v. State, 969 So. 2d 1060,
1067 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (same).
163
Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1205.
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right to counsel to the time period prior to interrogation and did not
communicate that Powell had the right to have a lawyer with him during the
interview as well. While the Powell majority thought it “counterintuitive”
for a “reasonable suspect” to assume that her attorney would not be allowed
in the interrogation room and instead that she would be “obligated, or
allowed, to hop in and out” of the room in order to consult with counsel, 164
that is precisely what grand jury witnesses must do in many jurisdictions in
order to seek legal advice from their lawyers.165
Importantly, the final portion of the Tampa warning advised Powell
that he had “the right to use any of these rights at any time you want during
this interview.” 166 While the majority has a point that this language may
imply that Powell “could exercise” the right to counsel “while the
interrogation was underway,” 167 it is also possible—as Justice Stevens
argued in dissent—that this “catchall clause does not meaningfully clarify
Powell’s rights” because it only told him he could “exercise the previously
listed rights at any time” and those did not include the right to have an
attorney with him during the interrogation. 168 Alternatively, the “before”
references and the final sentence could be viewed as giving conflicting
signals about the nature of a suspect’s right to counsel, thus creating
confusion.
Perhaps the majority properly interpreted the waiver form consistent
with a “commonsense reading,” whereas Justice Stevens was guilty of
“examin[ing] the words employed [by the police] ‘as if construing a will or
defining the terms of an easement.’” 169 Interestingly, however, in other
Miranda cases, the Court has embraced a similarly “hypertechnical” 170
interpretation of the words suspects happen to choose during interrogation.
Thus, for example, the Court has drawn a distinction depending on which of
the bundle of Miranda rights a suspect invokes—the right to silence or the

164

Id.
See 3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 69, § 8.14(c). Justice Alito made this point at oral
argument, although Powell’s counsel responded that most people have not appeared before a
grand jury. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 41–42, 56–57, Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (No.
08-1175).
166
Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1200.
167
Id. at 1205.
168
Id. at 1212 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also State v. Powell, 998
So. 2d 531, 541 (Fla. 2008) (making the same point).
169
Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1204–05 (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203
(1989)).
170
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 165, at 16 (argument made by the State of
Florida’s attorney).
165
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right to counsel 171—and also refused to interpret a suspect’s statement,
“[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer,” as a successful invocation of the right
to counsel. 172 Such strict, formalistic interpretations of suspects’ words are
inconsistent with Powell’s generous reading of the Tampa Police
Department’s waiver form.
Although the Court could easily have defended a decision in Powell’s
favor, its ruling will not necessarily have a catastrophic impact on
Miranda’s protections. Anxious suspects facing the coercive pressures of
custodial interrogation may be unlikely to distinguish fine variations in the
precise wording police use to communicate their rights. Moreover, Powell
did not retreat from the well-established proposition that Miranda entitles
suspects to the presence of a lawyer in the interrogation room, 173 and the
outcome of the case seemed to hinge on the final sentence in the warnings
given by the Tampa police. Without the additional information that Powell
could exercise his rights “at any time . . . during this interview,” it is not
obvious the Court would have been willing to overlook the “before”
references in the right-to-counsel warning. “In combination,” the Court
made clear, “the two warnings” adequately apprised Powell of his right to
have an attorney with him during interrogation.174
Symbolically, moreover, the Powell opinion was not one-sided. The
Powell Court did not use the word “prophylactic,” referring instead to
Miranda as “pathmarking.” 175 And the Court did not take the bait offered

171
Compare Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) (holding that the police must
“‘scrupulously honor[]’” the rights of a suspect who invokes the right to silence, but are not
absolutely barred from reinitiating interrogation after some time has elapsed) (quoting
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966)), with Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,
484–85 (1981) (deciding, by contrast, that a suspect who invokes the right to counsel may
not be interrogated “until counsel has been made available to him”). For further discussion
of this dichotomy, see infra notes 204–07 and accompanying text.
172
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462 (1994). For further discussion of the reach
of Davis, see infra notes 196–240 and accompanying text.
173
See Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1203 (observing that “an individual held for questioning
‘must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the
lawyer with him during interrogation’”) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471); see also supra
note 113 and accompanying text.
174
Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1205; see also id. (supporting the conclusion that “the warning
communicated that the right to counsel carried forward to and through the interrogation” by
observing that Powell was told he “could seek his attorney’s advice before responding to
‘any of [the officers’] questions’ and ‘at any time . . . during th[e] interview’”).
175
Id. at 1199.
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by the State and resort to a balancing test in reaching its decision in this
case. 176
Although the Powell decision was fact-bound and its impact likely to
be somewhat limited, it did deviate from both Supreme Court precedent and
lower court case law. Furthermore, the Court’s attempt to justify its ruling
on pragmatic grounds was not particularly convincing, though the
narrowness of the decision gives the police only limited room to try to
circumvent Miranda by rewording their warnings.
IV. BERGHUIS V. THOMPKINS
Even if Maryland v. Shatzer and Florida v. Powell can be viewed as
making only modest changes to Miranda, Berghuis v. Thompkins, 177 the last
of the three Miranda opinions issued during the Court’s 2009 Term, is an
entirely different story. After Thompkins was arrested and jailed on murder
charges, he was interrogated for about three hours by two Southfield,
Michigan police officers despite the fact that he had not waived his rights.
He was first given Miranda warnings by one of the officers, Detective
Helgert, but refused to sign a form indicating that he understood his
rights. 178 Helgert gave inconsistent testimony as to whether or not
Thompkins indicated verbally that he understood his rights,179 although
there was evidence that he was literate and familiar with English. 180
At that point, the officers immediately began the interrogation process.
They spent more than two hours trying to convince Thompkins that “this
was his chance to explain his version of events.” 181 The police “us[ed] the
ostrich head in the sand metaphor,” telling Thompkins, “[y]ou need to help
yourself, you need to put forth an explanation.” 182 According to Detective
Helgert, Thompkins was “[l]argely . . . silent” and “uncommunicative.” 183
176

Cf. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 120, at 26 n.9 (analogizing other
Supreme Court opinions that balanced the costs and benefits of suppressing confessions).
For discussion of the Court’s use of a balancing test in other confession cases, see supra
notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
177
130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).
178
The form, entitled “Notification of Constitutional Rights and Statement,” set out the
Miranda warnings and then asked, “Do you understand each of these rights that I have
explained to you?,” followed by a space for the suspect’s signature. See Brief for Petitioner
at 60, Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 08-1470).
179
See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2267 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
180
At Helgert’s request, Thompkins read one of the warnings on the form aloud. See
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2256.
181
Joint Appendix at 10a, Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 08-1470) (testimony of
Detective Helgert).
182
Id. at 150a.
183
Id. at 19a, 10a.
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He “sat there and listened” and “spent a lot of his time . . . simply holding
his head looking down.” 184 He made eye contact only a “few times,” in
response to Helgert’s request that Thompkins “look at me and pay
attention.” 185 Helgert described the conversation as “very, very one-sided,”
“nearly a monologue,” with Thompkins speaking or nodding his head only
“very sporadically.” 186 When he did speak, Thompkins said only “a word
or two,” “[a] ‘yeah’, or a ‘no’, or ‘I don’t know.’” 187 The only other words
Thompkins uttered were that he “didn’t want a peppermint” the police
offered to him and that “the chair that he was sitting in was hard.”188
After about two hours and forty-five minutes, Detective Helgert
decided to “take a different tac[k], . . . a spiritual tac[k],” 189 and asked
Thompkins whether he believed in God. Thompkins replied, “Yes,” and his
eyes “well[ed] up with tears.” 190 The officer followed up by inquiring
whether Thompkins prayed to God, and Thompkins again answered, “Yes.”
Finally, Helgert asked, “Have you prayed to God to forgive you for
shooting that boy down?” 191 For the third time, Thompkins responded,
“Yes.” He said nothing further other than “I ain’t writing nothing down,” 192
and the interrogation session ended approximately fifteen minutes later. 193
Rejecting Thompkins’s argument that his incriminating statement was
taken in violation of Miranda, the Supreme Court, in a five-to-four opinion,
concluded both that Thompkins never invoked his right to silence and that
he impliedly waived that right. The decision broke down into five separate
184

Id. at 22a, 152a.
Id. at 11a, 149a.
186
Id. at 10a, 17a, 9a.
187
Id. at 23a.
188
Id. at 152a.
189
Id. at 10a–11a.
190
Id. at 11a.
191
Id. at 20a.
192
Id. at 11a.
193
See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2257. The Court did not deny that Thompkins was
subjected to interrogation, repeatedly referring to the session as “the interrogation.” See,
e.g., id. at 2256–57, 2262–63. Moreover, the detectives used classic interrogation
techniques, which include “focusing [suspects’] attention on the importance of telling [their]
story,” Leo & White, supra note 22, at 435, thereby “distorting suspects’ perceptions of their
choices by leading them to believe that they will benefit by making a statement.”
Weisselberg, supra note 149, at 1537–38; see also Joint Appendix, supra note 181, at 15a,
20a (testimony of Detective Helgert) (acknowledging that the officers “did enter into an
interview mode” after Thompkins refused to sign the rights form, and then brought up
religion on the theory that Thompkins would likely be “[m]ore vulnerable to interrogation” if
he had “a deep faith”). In any event, Thompkins’s incriminating statement came in response
to a direct investigative question, which clearly satisfied the “express questioning” portion of
the definition of “interrogation” set forth in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01
(1980).
185
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elements. In the invocation discussion, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the
majority determined, first, that the unambiguous invocation requirement
applies to suspects who wish to invoke their right to remain silent. Second,
the majority impliedly refused to limit this clear invocation rule to those
who make a preliminary waiver of their rights. And third, the Court held
that Thompkins did not invoke his right to silence by remaining silent. In
the waiver discussion, the Court found that Thompkins impliedly waived
Miranda by failing to invoke his rights and then “making an uncoerced
statement to the police.” 194 Finally, the Court upheld the concept of prewaiver interrogation, refusing to mandate that police secure a waiver of
Miranda before they begin interrogating a suspect.195
Although the Court’s invocation analysis ratified the views adopted by
some lower courts, its discussion of implied waiver and pre-waiver
interrogation effected sweeping changes in the law, deviating from or at
least dramatically expanding Supreme Court precedent. Moreover, none of
the five components of the Court’s opinion can be reconciled with a
pragmatic approach to Miranda. Together, they allow law enforcement
officials to do a complete end run around Miranda, reducing the Warren
Court’s decision to a formalistic requirement that warnings be read and
otherwise reinstating the voluntariness due process test.
A. INVOKING THE RIGHT TO SILENCE

The Court reached its decision that Thompkins never asserted his right
to silence in three steps: first, that the clear invocation rule announced in
Davis v. United States 196 governs the right to remain silent as well as the
Miranda right to counsel; second, that Davis presumably applies even
where suspects did not initially waive their Miranda rights; and third, that
Thompkins did not unambiguously invoke the right to remain silent by
essentially remaining silent.
In Davis, the Court held that a suspect who wishes to assert the
Miranda right to counsel, and thereby enjoy the protection of the Edwards

194

Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264.
Because this case came to the federal courts on habeas, the Sixth Circuit had applied
the deferential standard of review mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which bars the federal courts from granting habeas relief on
“any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court,” unless the state court’s ruling
“was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006); see Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2259.
196
512 U.S. 452 (1994).
195
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line of cases, 197 “must articulate his desire to have counsel present
sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances
would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.”198 Holding
that the same unambiguous invocation requirement applies to the right to
remain silent, the Thompkins majority found “no principled reason to adopt
different standards” depending on which Miranda right a particular suspect
asserted. 199 In defending this position, Thompkins also resurrected Davis’s
argument that a clear invocation requirement “results in an objective inquiry
that ‘avoid[s] difficulties of proof and . . . provide[s] guidance to officers’
on how to proceed in the face of ambiguity.” 200
Unlike Shatzer and Powell, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Thompkins was a closely divided one, with the four dissenters objecting that
“Davis’ clear statement rule is . . . a poor fit for the right to silence.” 201
Nevertheless, the majority’s position aligned with the view taken by the
lower courts 202—although those courts had not engaged in much analysis,

197

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981) (holding that a suspect who
invokes the right to counsel “is not subject to further interrogation . . . until counsel has been
made available to him”). The line of cases following Edwards is described supra at note 39
and accompanying text.
198
Davis, 512 U.S. at 459; see also id. (warning that a suspect will not be deemed to
have asserted her Miranda right to counsel if she “makes a reference to an attorney that is
ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have
understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel”) (emphasis added).
Davis’s clear invocation rule has deservedly come under heavy fire. See, e.g., Janet E.
Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police
Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 320 (1993) (arguing that the expectation that suspects will
make “direct, assertive, unqualified invocations of counsel” is not only inconsistent with
Miranda’s basic premise that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive, but is also “a
gendered doctrine that privileges male speech norms, . . . thus disadvantag[ing] women and
other marginalized and relatively powerless groups in society”); Kinports, supra note 96, at
106–07 (observing that Davis’s reasonable police officer standard strayed from the focus on
the suspect’s perspective in other Miranda cases).
199
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2257.
200
Id. at 2260 (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 458–59).
201
Id. at 2276 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (endorsing instead use of the “scrupulously
honored” test here, which is described infra at note 204 and accompanying text). The
dissent acknowledged, however, that under the deferential standard of review imposed by the
AEDPA, “it is indeed difficult to conclude that the state court’s application of our
[invocation] precedents was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 2274; see supra note 195.
202
See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 450 F.3d 1201, 1211–12 (10th Cir. 2006)
(“‘[E]very circuit that has addressed the issue squarely has concluded that Davis applies to
both components of Miranda: the right to counsel and the right to remain silent.’”) (quoting
Bui v. DiPaolo, 170 F.3d 232, 239 (1st Cir. 1999)); Marcy Strauss, The Sounds of Silence:
Reconsidering the Invocation of the Right to Remain Silent Under Miranda, 17 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 773, 784–87 (2009).
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extensive or otherwise, but typically had just assumed that Davis applies in
both situations. 203
Despite the assumption made by the lower courts, the Supreme Court
has for years drawn a distinction between suspects who invoke the right to
counsel, thereby triggering the protections of the Edwards line of cases, and
those who invoke the right to silence. Michigan v. Mosley is the controlling
precedent for the latter group of suspects, and it requires only that police
“‘scrupulously honor[]’” the rights of a suspect who asserts the right to
remain silent.204 Thus, while the Davis Court feared that extending
Edwards’s “‘“rigid” prophylactic rule’” 205 would create a “‘wholly
irrational obstacle[] to legitimate police investigative activity’” in cases
where a suspect was not clearly asking for a lawyer, 206 that concern “applies
with less force” to Mosley’s “more flexible form of prophylaxis.” 207
Discounting the relevance of this dual line of cases, the Thompkins
majority cited Solem v. Stumes for the proposition that “‘[m]uch of the logic
and language of [Mosley] . . . could be applied to the invocation of the
[Miranda right to counsel].’” 208 But Stumes actually cuts the other way. In
fact, the sentence from Stumes quoted in Thompkins began by pointing out
that Mosley “distinguish[ed] the right to counsel from the right to
silence.” 209 Moreover, the issue before the Court in Stumes was whether
Edwards ought to apply retroactively. In declining to do so, Stumes relied
in part on the fact that Edwards had “establish[ed] a new rule” that was not
“‘clearly’ or ‘distinctly’ foreshadowed,” and therefore that law enforcement
officials could not be “faulted if they did not anticipate its per se
approach.” 210 Given that Mosley predated Edwards, the Court’s reasoning

203

See Strauss, supra note 202, at 786 (noting that most courts acted “perfunctorily,”
none offered “any detailed explanation,” and “[e]ven when some analysis is provided, it is
extraordinarily cursory”).
204
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103 (1975) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 479 (1966)) (finding the standard met on the facts there, where a different detective
approached Mosley two hours after he invoked his right to silence, reread the Miranda
warnings, and asked him about a different crime).
205
Davis, 512 U.S. at 458 (quoting Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984) (per curiam)
(quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979))).
206
Id. at 460 (quoting Mosley, 423 U.S. at 102).
207
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2275 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Strauss, supra
note 202, at 818–19 (arguing that the clear invocation rule should be “the ‘price’ of
Edwards,” whereas “the combination of Davis and Mosley stacks the deck for the state” and
has “an undesirable synergistic effect” that “place[s the police] in a win–win situation”).
208
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2260 (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 648 (1984)).
209
Stumes, 465 U.S. at 648.
210
Id. at 647–49 (also citing Mosley in support of the observation that “[t]he Court had
several times refused to adopt per se rules governing the waiver of Miranda rights”).
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in Stumes confirms the dichotomy between the two sets of precedents rather
than supporting Thompkins’s decision to conflate them.
In addition to ignoring the split between Mosley and Edwards, the
Thompkins Court’s decision to extend Davis to the right to remain silent
was not mandated by a pragmatic approach to Miranda. Although
Thompkins echoed Davis’s plea for readily administrable rules, Justice
Souter’s opinion in Davis offered the obvious counterpoint: if the police
wish to be “relieve[d] . . . of any responsibility for guessing” a suspect’s
preferences, they can simply “stop the[] interrogation and ask [the suspect]
to make his choice clear,” 211 an approach the Davis majority called “good
police practice” but expressly declined to require. 212
The second step of Thompkins’s invocation analysis was an implicit
one: the Court silently assumed that Davis applies in cases where suspects
did not initially waive their rights. After receiving Miranda warnings,
Davis executed a written waiver of his rights and expressly agreed to talk to
the investigators. Only later, after about ninety minutes of questioning, did
he make what the Court considered an ambiguous invocation of his right to
counsel by saying “[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer.” 213 That preliminary
waiver was an integral part of the Davis Court’s reasoning. In justifying the
decision to require an unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel, the
Court explained:
A suspect who knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to counsel after having that
right explained to him has indicated his willingness to deal with the police unassisted.
Although Edwards provides an additional protection—if a suspect subsequently

211

Davis, 512 U.S. at 474–75, 467 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); see also
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2277 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (likewise endorsing this
“straightforward mechanism”).
212
Davis, 512 U.S. at 461. Although the dominant lower court approach prior to Davis
mandated that police follow this “good practice,” see id. at 466–67 & n.1 (Souter, J.,
concurring in the judgment), in the wake of Davis, it now “appears that most [officers] do
not” stop to clarify the suspect’s wishes. Marcy Strauss, Understanding Davis v. United
States, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1011, 1058 (2007).
213
Davis, 512 U.S. at 462. But cf. Ainsworth, supra note 198, at 320 (observing that
“relatively powerless groups . . . are more likely to use less direct and assertive patterns of
speech”); Strauss, supra note 202, at 789 (finding that “many suspects subjected to the
intimidation inherent in custodial interrogation employ modal verbs—indirect, tentative
speech patterns”); Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan, Cops and Robbers: Selective
Literalism in American Criminal Law, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 229, 249 (2004) (pointing out
that “[p]eople tend to hedge when they are uncertain about something, but they also do it as a
means of expressing politeness,” and even “in ordinary conversation,” “most people speak
less directly, . . . especially when they impose on someone else by making a request or
command”).
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requests an attorney, questioning must cease—it is one that must be affirmatively
214
invoked by the suspect.

The Davis Court’s statement of its holding was likewise expressly
contingent on an initial waiver, 215 and the Thompkins dissenters were
therefore critical of the majority’s decision to “ignore[] this aspect of
Davis.” 216 Nevertheless, other language in Davis was not so limited, 217 and
a substantial number of lower courts had applied the Davis standard even
where no preliminary waiver occurred. 218 This question had provoked more
of a conflict than the extension of Davis to the right to silence, however,
and some courts had expressly restricted the clear invocation rule to
suspects who initially waived their rights.219
Again, it is difficult to reconcile any extension of Davis with a
pragmatic approach to Miranda when all the police need to do in cases of
ambiguity is ask the suspect to clarify her preferences. Moreover, limiting
the clear invocation rule to the post-waiver context would have assuaged
the Davis Court’s concerns about interrupting the flow of the interrogation
process and requiring the “cessation of questioning” in the face of any
ambiguous reference to counsel. 220 As the Second Circuit pointed out, the
prosecution has the burden of proving that a suspect waived Miranda, but
once that burden is satisfied, it is appropriate to give the suspect the burden
of establishing that she “resurrected rights previously waived” by clearly

214

Davis, 512 U.S. at 460–61.
Id. at 461 (“We therefore hold that, after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the
Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the
suspect clearly requests an attorney.”).
216
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2275 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
217
See Davis, 512 U.S. at 460 (while acknowledging that its ruling “might disadvantage
some suspects who—because of fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of
other reasons—will not clearly articulate their right to counsel although they actually want to
have a lawyer present,” the Court expressed the view that “the primary protection afforded
suspects subject to custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings themselves” and “‘[f]ull
comprehension of the rights to remain silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient to dispel
whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation process’”) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S. 412, 427 (1986)). For further discussion of Davis’s “primary protection” language and
Moran v. Burbine, see infra notes 266–75 and accompanying text.
218
See 2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 69, § 6.9(g), at 866 n.185; Weisselberg, supra note
149, at 1579.
219
E.g., United States v. Plugh, 576 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v.
Rodriguez, 518 F.3d 1072, 1079–80 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing state court opinions as
well); see also 2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 69, § 6.9(g), at 866 & n.185.
220
Davis, 512 U.S. at 459; see also id. (likewise expressing reluctance to require police
to “cease questioning,” and observing that a “statement [that] fails to meet the requisite level
of clarity . . . does not require that the officers stop questioning the suspect”).
215
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invoking them. 221 That shifting of the burden envisioned by Davis does not
make sense in a case where the suspect never waived Miranda in the first
place.
Finally, applying Davis’s clear invocation rule to the facts before it,
the Court was unsympathetic to Thompkins’s argument that he asserted his
right to remain silent “by not saying anything for a sufficient period of
time.” 222 Thompkins “did not say that he wanted to remain silent or that he
did not want to talk with the police,” the Court noted, and therefore he did
not effectively assert his right to silence.223 This final step in the majority’s
invocation analysis was again challenged by the four dissenters, who
pointed out that “[a]dvising a suspect that he has a ‘right to remain silent’ is
unlikely to convey that he must speak (and must do so in some particular
fashion) to ensure the right will be protected.”224
While a number of lower courts had not been particularly generous to
defendants whose statements were not crystal clear, 225 some courts had
ruled that a defendant who is silent is obviously asserting the right to

221

Plugh, 576 F.3d at 143; see also Rodriguez, 518 F.3d at 1079 (“Davis addressed what
the suspect must do to restore his Miranda rights after having already knowingly and
voluntarily waived them. It did not address what the police must obtain, in the initial waiver
context, to begin questioning.”) (emphasis omitted).
222
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2259–60 (2010).
223
Id. at 2260.
224
Id. at 2276 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Again, however, the dissent conceded that
Thompkins might lose under the AEDPA standard of review. See id. at 2274 (observing that
the Court’s precedents did not discuss whether a suspect who is “uncooperative and nearly
silent for 2 hours and 45 minutes” has invoked the right to silence); see also supra note 195.
225
See Strauss, supra note 202, at 775 (noting that “[j]udges have gone to extraordinary
lengths to classify even seemingly clear invocations as ambiguous invocations which can be
ignored by the police”); Tiersma & Solan, supra note 213, at 250 (“[A]ll too many judges
read requests for counsel the same way they would read a deed or promissory note: they
expect that suspects during interrogation will speak the way that lawyers write, leading them
to interpret the statements in a very literal way.”). For illustrations of statements that have
been found insufficient to invoke the right to silence, see Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2277 n.9
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“I’m not going to talk about nothin’,” and “I just don’t think that
I should say anything”); Strauss, supra note 202, at 789–90 & n.83 (“I can’t say anything
more now,” “I don’t know if I should speak to you,” and “Can I go?”); Weisselberg, supra
note 149, at 1580 (“I don’t have nothing to say” and “I think it’s about time for me to stop
talking”).
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remain silent. 226 The Solicitor General distinguished those cases on the
ground that Thompkins did not maintain complete silence,227 but it is
difficult to imagine how a suspect could be less communicative over the
space of almost three hours than Thompkins. During the course of what
Detective Helgert described as “nearly a monologue,” Thompkins made one
statement about a mint and another about his chair.228 Otherwise, he
nodded his head and said “yeah,” “no,” or “I don’t know” only “very
sporadically,” 229 and in a context that the record does not specify. 230
Moreover, the Court did not decide the case on that narrow ground. Rather,
the Court suggested that a suspect must actually “[s]peak[] [u]p to [s]tay
[s]ilent,” 231 a proposition that the dissent appropriately called
“counterintuitive[].” 232 Once again, the right to remain silent differs on a
fundamental practical level from the right to counsel: a suspect sitting in a
police interrogation room must say something in order to trigger the
appearance of an attorney, but need not say or do anything affirmative in
order to actualize her unwillingness to talk to the police.

226

See United States v. Montana, 958 F.2d 516, 518 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that “a
defendant’s silence in the face of repeated questioning has been held sufficient to invoke the
Fifth Amendment privilege”); State v. Hodges, 77 P.3d 375, 377–78 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003)
(concluding that “[s]ilence in the face of repeated questioning over a period of time may
constitute an invocation of the right to remain silent,” but finding no clear invocation there
based on suspect’s silence in response to one question because he initially answered
questions and “shortly thereafter answered a different officer’s question without hesitation”);
see also 2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 69, § 6.9(g), at 853–54 & n.150, 857 n.158 (citing
conflicting cases on this point, but concluding that “silence in the face of repeated
questioning” should be enough); Strauss, supra note 202, at 792 (likewise citing conflicting
cases, though noting that “[m]ost courts . . . seem to deem silence, even lengthy silence, as
ambiguous”).
227
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 18, Thompkins,
130 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 08-1470); see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 178, at 29 (“This is
not a case where a suspect remained silent.”).
228
Joint Appendix, supra note 181, at 17a, 152a.
229
Id. at 9a, 23a; see also supra notes 181–93 and accompanying text.
230
See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2270–71 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he record
before us [is] silent as to the subject matter or context of even a single question to which
Thompkins purportedly responded, other than the exchange about God and the statements
respecting the peppermint and the chair.”); Thompkins v. Berghuis, 547 F.3d 572, 587 (6th
Cir. 2008) (noting that the detective’s testimony did not “provid[e] any context” for
Thompkins’s occasional one-word statements, and concluding that the case would be very
different had Thompkins “nodded his head in response to a question asking whether [he]
wanted his side of the story to be known”) (emphasis omitted), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2250
(2010).
231
Editorial, Speaking up to Stay Silent, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2010, at A24.
232
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2278 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Strauss, supra
note 202, at 792 (noting that silence may be “the ultimate invocation”).
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Although the majority did not try to defend this third step in the
invocation discussion on pragmatic grounds, the Solicitor General argued
that police may not know whether a suspect who says nothing is invoking
the right to remain silent or instead is “formulating an explanation of events
that lessens his culpability, planning an alibi, or thinking through his
options.” 233 Additionally, the “scrupulously honor” standard endorsed by
the Thompkins dissenters, as even they acknowledged, is “fact-specific” and
“does not provide police with a bright-line rule.” 234 Of course, however, it
is the same standard that Mosley articulated and that law enforcement
officials “have for nearly 35 years applied.”235 Moreover, it seems that
Davis’s “reasonable police officer” 236 should have known that someone like
Thompkins—who managed to sit in virtual silence with his eyes cast down
for almost three hours—was no longer “thinking through his options,” but
had no interest in participating in the conversation. And apparently that is
precisely how Detective Helgert interpreted Thompkins’s behavior: at the
suppression hearing, the officer responded affirmatively when asked
whether Thompkins’s incriminating statement came “after [Thompkins] had
consistently exercised his right to remain substantively silent for at least
two hours and forty-five (45) minutes.” 237
The Court’s tripartite analysis of Thompkins’s invocation claim is
extremely cursory, taking up less than one page in the Supreme Court
Reporter. Moreover, the Court’s insistence that suspects speak with
absolute precision is particularly ironic given its willingness just three
months earlier in Florida v. Powell to afford a “commonsense reading” to
the words the police use in administering Miranda warnings, 238 for fear that
they “may inadvertently depart from routine practice.”239 If it makes sense
to take the fluidity of the interrogation process into account and refuse to
“examine the words employed [by the police] ‘as if construing a will or
defining the terms of an easement,’” at minimum the same leniency should
be accorded suspects, who are not in control of the situation and who are
233

Brief for the United States, supra note 227, at 18 (concluding that silence does “not
convey an unambiguous message”); see also Strauss, supra note 202, at 792 (observing that
suspects could be silent because “they have not yet found a topic they want to discuss”).
234
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2276 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
235
Id.
236
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994); see supra note 198 and
accompanying text.
237
Joint Appendix, supra note 181, at 20a; see also id. (When asked whether Thompkins
“exercised [his right to remain silent] continuously for two hours and forty-five (45) minutes
in terms of substantive responses to your attempts to elicit statements regarding this
offense,” Helgert replied, “Much of the time. Most of the time, yes.”).
238
130 S. Ct. 1195, 1205 (2010).
239
Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989).
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facing the coercive pressures of custodial interrogation.240 In deciding
otherwise, the Thompkins Court’s conclusory invocation discussion may
have been consistent with some lower court case law, but it deviated from a
pragmatic approach to Miranda.
B. WAIVING THE RIGHT TO SILENCE

After finding that Thompkins never invoked his right to silence, the
Court turned to the question of waiver. Miranda required the prosecution to
shoulder the burden of establishing that a suspect waived her rights, the
Thompkins Court acknowledged, and Thompkins’s failure to assert his
rights did not automatically satisfy that burden.241 As the Court noted in
Smith v. Illinois, “[i]nvocation and waiver are entirely distinct inquiries, and
the two must not be blurred by merging them together.”242 Nevertheless,
the Court concluded that Thompkins did waive his rights under the two-part
implied waiver doctrine set out in North Carolina v. Butler, where the
Court suggested that a suspect’s “silence, coupled with an understanding of
his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver,” constitutes an implied
waiver of Miranda. 243
First, the Court reasoned, there was sufficient evidence that
Thompkins understood his rights, given that he “received a written copy of
the Miranda warnings” and “could read and understand English.” 244 And,
second, the one-word response he gave when Detective Helgert asked
whether he had prayed to be forgiven for shooting the victim—even though
it came “about three hours” later—was “sufficient to show a course of
conduct indicating waiver.” 245 “If Thompkins wanted to remain silent,” the
Court explained, “he could have said nothing in response to Helgert’s
questions, or he could have unambiguously invoked his Miranda rights and

240

Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1204 (quoting Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203).
See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010) (noting that “[e]ven absent
the accused’s invocation of the right to remain silent,” a confession is not admissible “unless
the prosecution can establish” a valid waiver of Miranda); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 470 (1966) (cautioning that the “failure to ask for a lawyer does not constitute a
waiver”).
242
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984) (per curiam).
243
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979). But cf. 2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra
note 69, § 6.9(d), at 832 (noting that “it has been argued with some force” that a suspect’s
“‘acknowledgement of understanding adds nothing more to the circumstances beyond mere
silence’” because “an understanding of rights and an intention to waive them are two
different things”) (quoting 2 WILLIAM E. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND
CONFESSIONS 28-6 (2d ed. 1982)).
244
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2262.
245
Id. at 2263 (reasoning that “[p]olice are not required to rewarn suspects from time to
time”).
241
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ended the interrogation.” 246 Justice Kennedy added that this conclusion was
“confirmed” by the “sporadic answers” Thompkins gave to “questions
throughout the interrogation,” but his opinion did not put much emphasis on
that fact. 247 He mentioned it only once; by contrast, he repeated several
times that the implied waiver doctrine could be satisfied simply by an
“uncoerced statement” combined with evidence that the Miranda warnings
were “understood by the accused.” 248 Here, again, the Court was deeply
splintered, with the four dissenters objecting that the prosecutor’s burden of
proving waiver could not be met “on a record consisting of three one-word
answers, following 2 hours and 45 minutes of silence punctuated by a few
largely nonverbal responses to unidentified questions.” 249
Although the Thompkins majority did not discuss the state of the lower
court case law, its implied waiver ruling effected a more dramatic change in
the law than its invocation analysis. The lower courts had split on the
propriety of finding a “course of conduct indicating waiver” based solely on
a suspect’s incriminating statements, but even the courts that had found the
Butler standard satisfied tended to involve scenarios very different from
Thompkins. In most of those cases, the suspect explicitly acknowledged
that she understood her rights, followed closely by an incriminating
statement. The courts were therefore able to say that those defendants,
unlike Thompkins, “freely talk[ed]” to the police, 250 displayed “no
hesitancy,” 251 or participated in a “two-way conversation.” 252 Moreover,
other courts had expressly refused to uphold the validity of an implied
246

Id.
Id.
248
Id. at 2262; see also id. at 2261 (“If the State establishes that a Miranda warning was
given and the accused made an uncoerced statement, this showing, standing alone, is
insufficient to demonstrate ‘a valid waiver’ of Miranda rights. The prosecution must make
the additional showing that the accused understood these rights.”); id. at 2263 (“Thompkins
knowingly and voluntarily made a statement to police, so he waived his right to remain
silent.”); id. at 2264 (“In sum, a suspect who has received and understood the Miranda
warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right to remain silent by
making an uncoerced statement to the police . . . . Understanding his rights in full,
[Thompkins] waived his right to remain silent by making a voluntary statement to the
police.”).
249
Id. at 2271 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
250
United States v. Upton, 512 F.3d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 2008).
251
State v. Kirtdoll, 136 P.3d 417, 423 (Kan. 2006).
252
Bui v. DiPaolo, 170 F.3d 232, 241 (1st Cir. 1999); see also id. at 240–41 (surveying
other federal cases and finding that “the implied waiver profile” included cases involving a
“‘steady stream’ of speech” or “back-and-forth conversation”) (citing, respectively, Bradley
v. Meachum, 918 F.2d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1990), and Baskin v. Clark, 956 F.2d 142, 146 (7th
Cir. 1992)); 2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 69, § 6.9(d), at 832 (maintaining that “while an
acknowledgement of understanding should not inevitably carry the day, it is especially
significant when defendant’s incriminating statement follows immediately thereafter”).
247
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waiver made by a suspect who was initially unresponsive to police
questioning. 253 Thus, as Justice Sotomayor’s dissent pointed out, the courts
generally “required a showing of words or conduct beyond inculpatory
statements.” 254
The Thompkins majority did, however, cite its own prior cases,
claiming that its implied waiver ruling was consistent with precedent. The
Court acknowledged that Miranda not only spoke of the “heavy burden”
required to demonstrate a waiver of rights but also made clear that waiver
may not be “presumed simply from” a suspect’s “silence” or “simply from
the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.” 255 But in the
very next sentence, the Thompkins Court seemed to equivocate, observing
that its post-Miranda decisions, “informed by . . . the whole course of law
enforcement,” had rejected any requirement of “formal or express
statements of waiver.” 256 That statement is obviously unobjectionable in
light of Butler, but the notion that waivers can be inferred does not diminish
the fact that neither silence nor an eventual incriminating statement suffices
to demonstrate any sort of waiver, express or implied.
In fact, Butler conceded as much. The Butler opinion quoted all of the
relevant waiver language from Miranda set out in the prior paragraph.257 In
addition, Butler independently referred to the Government’s burden of
proof as “great” and pointed out that “[t]he courts must presume that a
defendant did not waive his rights.” 258 And subsequent Supreme Court

253
See United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1475 (9th Cir. 1988) (refusing to find
implied waiver where suspect “maintained her silence for several minutes and, perhaps, as
many as ten minutes” “[i]n the face of repeated questioning”); cf. United States v. Plugh, 576
F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2009) (concluding that suspect’s “refusal to sign [a waiver form]
constituted an unequivocally negative answer to the question . . . whether he was willing to
waive his rights”).
254
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2270 n.4 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
255
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966), quoted in Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at
2261. The Warren Court also observed that a “lengthy interrogation” preceding a confession
is “strong evidence” of an invalid waiver. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476. For discussion of
Thompkins’s response to this language, see infra notes 375–77 and accompanying text.
256
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2261.
257
See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 372–73 (1979) (quoting both the phrase
“heavy burden” and the language making clear that neither silence nor a confession satisfies
that burden); see also id. at 373 (“As was unequivocally said in Miranda, mere silence is not
enough.”).
258
Id. at 373; cf. Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 470 (1980) (per curiam) (endorsing
the view that presuming that a suspect understands her rights contravenes Miranda).
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decisions likewise reiterated those concepts.259 Thompkins therefore made
an unwarranted leap from the noncontroversial proposition that the
prosecutor “does not need to show that a waiver of Miranda rights was
express” to the conclusion that a suspect who “understood” her rights and
made an “uncoerced statement” impliedly waived her rights.260
Moreover, the Thompkins Court shortchanged Miranda’s underlying
goals, attempting to defend the position that waivers need not be “formal or
express” by describing the “main purpose” of the landmark decision as
“ensur[ing] that an accused is advised of and understands” her rights.261
While that was obviously one of Miranda’s objectives, it also intended to
alleviate “the compelling influence of the interrogation.” 262 Thus, the
Miranda Court did indicate that “[f]or those unaware of the privilege, the
warning is needed simply to make them aware of it.” 263 But even “[m]ore
important,” the Court continued, the warnings are “an absolute prerequisite
in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere.”264
As a result, the fact that a particular suspect understood her rights was not
enough to satisfy the Miranda Court. Rather, the Court warned, “we will
not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of
his rights” because, “whatever the background of the person interrogated, a
warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its
pressures.” 265
Despite the fact that the Court clearly thought it was aiming higher in
Miranda, Thompkins relied on two subsequent cases—Davis v. United

259

See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 680 (1988) (quoting Miranda’s “heavy
burden” language); Tague, 444 U.S. at 470–71 (quoting Miranda’s phrase “heavy burden,”
as well as the language in Butler characterizing the Government’s burden as “great” and
refusing to allow presumptions of waiver); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724 (1979)
(likewise quoting Miranda’s “heavy burden” standard).
260
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2261, 2262.
261
Id. at 2261.
262
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966); see Dickerson v. United States, 530
U.S. 428, 435 (2000) (finding that “the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation blurs the
line between voluntary and involuntary statements”); see also infra notes 302–06 and
accompanying text.
263
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468.
264
Id. (noting, in addition, that the warnings “show the individual that his interrogators
are prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to exercise it”).
265
Id. at 468–69; see also id. (observing that “[a]ssessments of the knowledge the
defendant possessed . . . can never be more than speculation,” whereas “a warning is a
clearcut fact”); id. at 471–72 (admonishing that “[n]o amount of circumstantial evidence that
the person may have been aware of this right will suffice to stand in its stead”). For
discussion of an additional way the Thompkins Court undermined Miranda—by resurrecting
the voluntariness due process test—see infra notes 370–78 and accompanying text.
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States 266 and Moran v. Burbine 267—for the proposition that “Miranda’s
main protection lies in advising defendants of their rights” and therefore
“less formal” waivers are permissible. 268 To be sure, the Davis Court did
observe that “‘the primary protection afforded suspects subject[ed] to
custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings themselves.’” 269 The
Thompkins Court, however, took this statement wildly out of context.
Davis, the opinion which first articulated the clear invocation rule, was
addressing what the Court called the “‘second layer of [Miranda]
prophylaxis,’” the protection under Edwards (and Mosley) for suspects who
assert their rights. 270 Thus, several sentences later, the Davis Court said,
“[a]lthough Edwards provides an additional protection—if a suspect
subsequently requests an attorney, questioning must cease—it is one that
must be affirmatively invoked by the suspect.” 271 When read in context,
then, the Davis Court was pointing out that the “primary protection” given
suspects is Miranda’s first layer—the warning and waiver procedures set
out in Miranda itself—and that suspects must act affirmatively in order to
engage the second layer. But Davis did not purport to address the nature of
the first layer or to affect Miranda’s waiver requirements. In fact, as noted
above, the issue of waiver did not arise in that case because Davis expressly
waived his rights prior to interrogation.272
Thompkins’s reliance on Moran v. Burbine is similarly misplaced;
again, Thompkins accurately quoted its precedent but omitted the relevant
context. As the Thompkins Court pointed out, Burbine did include the
observation that, “‘as Miranda holds, full comprehension of the rights to
remain silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient to dispel whatever
coercion is inherent in the interrogation process.’” 273 Put into context,
however, it is obvious that the Burbine Court was explaining its decision
not to require the police to provide suspects with additional information
above and beyond what Miranda contemplates—there, that an attorney had

266

512 U.S. 452 (1994).
475 U.S. 412 (1986).
268
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2262 (2010).
269
Id. at 2263 (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 460); see also id. at 2259, 2261–62 (again
citing Davis for this point).
270
Davis, 512 U.S. at 458 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176 (1991)).
For a description of Davis’s clear invocation rule, see supra notes 197–98 and accompanying
text.
271
Davis, 512 U.S. at 461.
272
See supra text accompanying note 213.
273
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2260 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986));
see also id. at 2261, 2262 (again citing Burbine for this proposition).
267
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tried to contact Burbine. 274 The Burbine Court did not intend even to
address, much less “reduce[] the impact” of, Miranda’s core requirements
or its waiver rules. Like Davis, Burbine was a case where the suspect
executed a written waiver of his rights; in fact, Burbine signed three waiver
forms prior to being interrogated. 275 Thus, neither Davis nor Burbine
supported the Thompkins Court’s grudging view of the policy goals
underlying Miranda or its expansive view of the implied waiver doctrine.
In addition to undermining Miranda and misciting Davis and Burbine,
Thompkins also dramatically extended North Carolina v. Butler. The
implied waiver standard articulated in that case required proof that the
suspect understood her rights and engaged in “a course of conduct
indicating waiver.” 276 But the Thompkins majority took that notion much
further in holding that a single “uncoerced statement” constituted “a course
of conduct indicating waiver.” 277 In fact, most of the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Butler was focused on rejecting the state supreme court’s
“inflexible per se rule” that Miranda waivers must be express, and the
Court did not even indicate whether the implied waiver standard was
satisfied on the facts before it.278
Even so, Butler is a far cry from Thompkins. Butler specifically and
“repeatedly” acknowledged that he understood his rights, and he expressly
agreed to talk to the police. 279 But he declined to sign a waiver form,
saying “I will talk to you but I am not signing any form.” 280 There was no
indication that any time elapsed between Butler’s refusal to execute a
written waiver and his answers to the FBI agent’s questions. 281 Moreover,
he participated fully in the conversation that followed, providing detailed

274
The complete sentence read as follows: “Because, as Miranda holds, full
comprehension of the rights to remain silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient to dispel
whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation process, a rule requiring the police to
inform the suspect of an attorney’s efforts to contact him would contribute to the protection
of the Fifth Amendment privilege only incidentally, if at all.” Burbine, 475 U.S. at 427.
275
See id. at 417–18.
276
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979).
277
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2262.
278
Butler, 441 U.S. at 375; see also id. at 370 (“We granted certiorari to consider
whether [the North Carolina Supreme Court’s] per se rule reflects a proper understanding of
the Miranda decision.”).
279
State v. Butler, 244 S.E.2d 410, 412 (N.C. 1978).
280
Butler, 441 U.S. at 371.
281
See Butler, 244 S.E.2d at 412 (“Since defendant had stated he would talk to Officer
Martinez, he was then asked ‘if he had participated in the armed robbery and he stated that
he was there but that he did not actually participate as such in the armed robbery.’”) (quoting
FBI agent’s testimony) (emphasis added).
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responses to the agent’s inquiries. 282 Thompkins, by contrast, refused to
sign a form even acknowledging that he understood the Miranda warnings,
and the record did not clearly indicate whether he verbally expressed an
understanding of his rights. 283 He then sat in virtual silence for almost three
hours, ultimately uttering a single incriminating word. The two cases are
therefore very different in terms of each prong of Butler’s implied waiver
standard—both the evidence that the defendant understood his Miranda
rights and that he engaged in a “course of conduct indicating waiver.”
By extending Butler’s implied waiver doctrine to a case like
Thompkins, the Court allows the police to “persist[] in repeated efforts to
wear down [a suspect’s] resistance,” and then argue that she impliedly
waived her rights as soon as she slips and says one responsive word. 284
This result flies in the face of Miranda’s admonition that a finding of
waiver cannot be predicated “simply [on] the fact that a confession was in
fact eventually obtained.”285 In Thompkins’s case, there was nothing—
other than the one-word “confession”—on which to base a finding of
“conduct indicating waiver.”
Despite its lack of fidelity to precedent, the Thompkins Court
purported to defend its waiver decision on pragmatic grounds, observing
that “the practical constraints and necessities of interrogation” dictate that
Miranda waivers be accomplished “through means less formal than a
typical waiver on the record in a courtroom.” 286 Likewise, the Court
282
In response to the officer’s first question, Butler admitted being present at the scene
of the robbery but denied participating in the crime. See supra note 281. At that point, the
following conversation took place:

“We asked him to explain a little further and he stated that he and an accomplice had been
drinking heavily that day and were walking around and decided to rob a gas station. They came
up to a gas station where the attendant was locking up for the night and walked inside the station.
[Butler] stated that the fellow with him pulled out a gun and told the gas station attendant to get
in his car. He then said that the gas station attendant tried to run away and that his friend shot the
attendant. At this point Mr. Butler stated that he ran away from them and didn’t look back. He
stated that he ran to a bus station where he caught a bus to Virginia and that in Virginia he caught
another bus to New York where he had been until he was apprehended that morning. We asked
him if the other person was someone by the name of Elmer Lee and we had had communications
from our Charlotte office saying that Elmer Lee had also been involved. Butler said that Lee was
there.”

State v. Butler, 244 S.E.2d at 412 (quoting FBI agent’s testimony).
283
See supra note 179 and accompanying text. The conflict in the testimony on this
point perhaps explains why Justice Kennedy relied only on the fact that Thompkins was
literate and understood English in finding sufficient evidence that he understood his rights.
See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2262 (2010); see also supra note 244 and
accompanying text.
284
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 105–06 (1975).
285
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
286
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2262.
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referenced the importance of “‘reduc[ing] the impact of the Miranda rule on
legitimate law enforcement.’”287 But the police conduct in Thompkins more
closely resembled a deliberate effort to circumvent Miranda than one
prompted by the needs of “legitimate law enforcement” or the “practical
constraints” of interrogation. The notification of rights paper Thompkins
was given to sign was not a waiver of rights form; rather, it simply inquired
whether he understood his rights. 288 The police therefore may have made a
strategic decision not to ask suspects whether they were willing to waive
their rights, for fear that they would not get the answer they were looking
for. 289 Whatever the intent of Detective Helgert and the Southfield,
Michigan Police Department, the Court’s decision allows law enforcement
officials who are determined to subvert Miranda to engage in this very
behavior—to manipulate the implied waiver doctrine and make a case for
waiver so long as they read the warnings in a language the suspect can
understand and she eventually makes some incriminating statement, even
hours into the interrogation session. In so holding, Thompkins’s implied
waiver discussion deviated substantially from both Supreme Court
precedent and a pragmatic approach to Miranda.
C. INTERROGATING WITHOUT WAIVER

As damaging to Miranda as Thompkins’s invocation and implied
waiver holdings were, the biggest blow to the landmark ruling came in the
final portion of the Court’s decision. In three quick paragraphs, the Court
rejected Thompkins’s argument that the officers were required to wait until
he had waived his rights before beginning to interrogate him. So long as
the police make sure a suspect “receives adequate Miranda warnings,
understands them, and has an opportunity to invoke the rights before giving
any answers or admissions,” the Court said, they may start the interrogation
process even though the suspect “has neither invoked nor waived”
Miranda. 290 In combination with the Court’s implied waiver analysis, the
287

Id. at 2261 (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000)).
See supra note 178. The form, entitled “Notification of Constitutional Rights and
Statement,” was referred to by the State as a “notification form,” see Reply Brief at 7,
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 08-1470), and by the Solicitor General as an “advice of
rights form.” See Brief for the United States, supra note 227, at 2.
289
Compare Weisselberg, supra note 149, at 1585 (reporting that “[a]dvanced [police]
training on implied waivers is widespread” in California, and even though “express waivers
are preferred for proof purposes,” some “trainers emphasize the legality and strategic
advantages of implied waivers”), with Transcript of Oral Argument at 26–27, Thompkins,
130 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 08-1470) (argument made by the Solicitor General’s office) (noting
that federal agents often try to secure written waivers “to avoid . . . problems of proof” at
trial).
290
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263, 2264.
288
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pre-waiver interrogation part of the opinion reduces Miranda to a mere
formality, essentially mandating only that the police remember to
administer the warnings and otherwise reinstating the voluntariness due
process test Miranda was designed to replace.
Surprisingly, this portion of the Court’s opinion did not elicit much
reaction from the four dissenters, 291 even though it contradicted wellestablished assumptions made in both prior Supreme Court opinions and the
lower courts that the proper sequencing is warnings-waiver-interrogation.
Although the majority did not discuss the lower courts’ treatment of this
issue, its decision went well beyond the prevailing lower court practice:
most courts had not allowed the police to keep a suspect in interrogation 292
for almost three hours before securing a Miranda waiver. 293
The Thompkins majority did, however, claim that its decision was
consistent with its own precedent, even Miranda itself. In fact, the Court
set the stage for this part of the opinion when it first introduced Miranda
without any reference to waiver, simply describing the case as having
“formulated a warning that must be given to suspects before they can be
subjected to custodial interrogation.” 294 Then, in the portion of the opinion
approving pre-waiver interrogation, the Court cited Miranda for two
propositions: first, that a suspect’s confession is not “admissible at trial”
unless she received Miranda warnings; 295 and second, that once the
administration of warnings has been proven, the courts may “proceed to
consider” whether the suspect waived her rights.296 (Notably, the Court had
no support for the sentence that followed—that in evaluating whether the
evidence suffices to demonstrate a valid waiver of Miranda, the courts “of
course” may “consider[] . . . the whole course of questioning.” 297)
Although the Court did not specify the precise language in Miranda on
which it was relying for either proposition, both the State of Michigan and
the Solicitor General quoted language found on the same pages cited by the
Court in support of their theory that only the warnings themselves (and not

291
The dissent did point out, however, that “many contemporary police training
resources instruct officers to obtain a waiver of rights prior to proceeding at all with an
interrogation.” Id. at 2270 n.3 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
292
As discussed above, see supra note 193, there was no dispute that Thompkins was
subjected to interrogation.
293
See supra notes 250–54 and accompanying text (citing cases where suspects freely
participated in the conversation from the beginning).
294
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2259.
295
Id. at 2264 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966)).
296
Id. (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476).
297
Id.
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a preliminary waiver) are “an absolute prerequisite to interrogation,”298
whereas both the warnings and proof of waiver are “prerequisites to the
admissibility” of the defendant’s confession in court. 299 Thus, these parties
took the position that Miranda’s “unstated point here” was that the police
are allowed to interrogate as soon as they read the warnings, but the
prosecution may not introduce any statement emerging from that
interrogation until “it establishes that a waiver occurred.” 300 This
formalistic interpretation of Chief Justice Warren’s words, while literally
accurate, contradicts other language in his opinion, undermines the Miranda
Court’s fundamental assumptions about police interrogation, and
contravenes the very notion of waiver.
First, other portions of the Miranda opinion linked the concept of
“warnings and waiver” together, thus explicitly repudiating the Thompkins
Court’s approval of pre-waiver interrogation. The Miranda Court noted,
for example, that “[t]he requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a
fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply
a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation.” 301 This language
suggested that both the administration of Miranda warnings and the
elicitation of a waiver are at minimum the “preliminary ritual” necessary
before interrogation may begin.
Second, the notion that police may conduct interrogations before
obtaining a waiver contravenes Miranda’s fundamental premise about the
inherent coerciveness of police interrogation—that, in the words of Chief
Justice Warren, “the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll
on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals.” 302 Even
though the Miranda decision was a compromise—it did not go so far as to
place a lawyer in every interrogation room, prohibit particular interrogation

298
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471 (emphasis added), quoted in Brief for the United States,
supra note 227, at 20–21; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 178, at 41 (relying on
Miranda’s statement that a suspect must “‘be warned prior to any questioning’” in support of
the same argument) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479).
299
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 (emphasis added), quoted in Brief for Petitioner, supra note
178, at 40 and Brief for the United States, supra note 227, at 21; see also Reply Brief, supra
note 288, at 15–16 (citing Miranda’s statement that a confession is inadmissible “‘unless and
until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial’” in support of
the same argument) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479).
300
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 178, at 41; see also Brief for the United States, supra
note 227, at 20–21 (making the same argument).
301
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 (emphasis added); see also id. at 477 (observing that “[t]he
principles announced today deal with the protection which must be given to the privilege
against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected to police interrogation”).
302
Id. at 455.
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techniques, or put an end to interrogation altogether 303—the Court was not
naive enough to believe that the coercive potential of interrogation suddenly
disappears as soon as a suspect is read her rights.
In fact, the Miranda opinion repeatedly spoke of the compulsion that
continues to pervade the interrogation room after warnings are read. For
example, the Court recognized that even “[o]nce warnings have been
given . . . , the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual
to overcome free choice.” 304 Likewise, in discussing the importance of the
right to counsel, the Miranda Court noted that “[t]he circumstances
surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear
the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators.” 305
Therefore, the Court realistically acknowledged, “[a] once-stated warning,
delivered by those who will conduct the interrogation,” cannot dispel the
inherent compulsion characterizing the interrogation process.306 The same
Court could not have envisioned that the police would merely read the
required warnings and then immediately launch into what the Court saw as
an inherently coercive process without first securing a waiver.
Finally, Thompkins’s concept of pre-waiver interrogation flies in the
face of the fundamental essence of waiver. By waiving Miranda, a suspect
is giving up her right not to be interrogated if she prefers not to speak to the
police at all or wishes to do so only with the assistance of an attorney.
Thus, the notion of pre-waiver interrogation allows the police to conduct a
procedure that requires a waiver and hope that evidence of that waiver will
turn up later. No one would argue that the police may begin a warrantless
consent search without first obtaining consent,307 or that the prosecutor may
start calling witnesses at trial in the absence of defense counsel unless the
defendant has already waived the right to counsel,308 and then rely on “the

303

See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473–74.
305
Id. at 469; see also Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1203 (2010) (quoting this
language in making the same point).
306
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469; see also id. at 469–70 (likewise observing that “[a] mere
warning given by the interrogators is not alone sufficient to accomplish that end”). The
Court has reiterated this point on other occasions. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146,
153–54 (1990) (noting that Miranda “specifically rejected [the] theory that [even] the
opportunity to consult with one’s attorney would substantially counteract the compulsion
created by custodial interrogation,” given that “[a] single consultation with an attorney does
not remove the suspect from . . . the coercive pressures that accompany custody”).
307
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (allowing searches without
probable cause or a warrant if “conducted pursuant to consent”).
308
See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) (deciding that criminal defendants
have a Sixth Amendment right to “proceed without counsel” at trial if they “voluntarily and
intelligently elect[] to do so”) (emphasis omitted).
304
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whole course” of subsequent developments to prove the necessary
waiver. 309
Thus, the more plausible explanation for the language in Miranda
quoted by the State and Solicitor General is that everyone assumed the
proper sequencing would be warnings-waiver-interrogation and Chief
Justice Warren never considered the possibility that the few isolated
references to “warnings” preceding interrogation would be interpreted
literally and not as shorthand for the whole “warnings and waiver” process.
Certainly, that is how the majority opinion was interpreted by the Miranda
dissenters, 310 and how it has been read by later Supreme Court opinions, 311

309

Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2264 (2010); cf. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S.
91, 98 (1984) (per curiam) (holding that a suspect’s “subsequent statements” cannot be used
to cast doubt on her prior invocation of Miranda rights, but instead are “relevant only to the
question” whether she later waived the rights she had previously invoked). But cf. Laurent
Sacharoff, Miranda’s Hidden Right, 3–4 (Working Paper Series Nov. 18, 2010) (draft),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1711410 (posted Nov. 19, 2010) (arguing that the
Supreme Court has implicitly treated the Miranda right to silence as encompassing “two
distinct sub-rights”—the right “literally not to speak” and the right “to cut off police
questioning”—and has required affirmative invocation only of the latter, thus allowing the
police to begin interrogation so long as the suspect “has not invoked his right to cut off
police questioning,” but refusing to admit any confession that results from the interrogation
absent proof that “he waived the right not to speak”).
310
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 526 (White, J., dissenting) (opening his dissent by objecting
that “[t]he proposition that the privilege against self-incrimination forbids in-custody
interrogation without the warnings specified in the majority opinion and without a clear
waiver of counsel has no significant support in the history of the privilege or in the language
of the Fifth Amendment”); id. at 537 (describing the majority opinion as “declar[ing] that the
accused may not be interrogated without counsel present, absent a waiver of the right to
counsel”); id. at 502 (Clark, J., dissenting) (protesting that “even in Escobedo the Court
never hinted that an affirmative ‘waiver’ was a prerequisite to questioning”); id. at 521
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (illustrating his observation that the FBI procedure in effect at that
time “falls sensibly short of the Court’s formalistic rule[]” by noting that “there is no
indication that FBI agents must obtain an affirmative ‘waiver’ before they pursue their
questioning”).
311
See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608 (2004) (plurality opinion) (noting, in
explaining the procedures dictated by Miranda, that “failure to give the prescribed warnings
and obtain a waiver of rights before custodial questioning generally requires exclusion of
any statements obtained”) (emphasis added); Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458
(1994) (describing the Miranda rules and observing, “[i]f the suspect effectively waives his
right to counsel after receiving the Miranda warnings, law enforcement officers are free to
question him”); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 420 (1986) (pointing out that the police
“followed [the Miranda] procedures with precision,” and explaining that they “administered
the required warnings, sought to assure that respondent understood his rights, and obtained
an express written waiver prior to eliciting each of the three statements”).

426

KIT KINPORTS

[Vol. 101

by the authors of interrogation manuals, 312 and by commentators. 313 In fact,
in a recent symposium honoring Miranda’s fortieth anniversary, both a
persistent critic of the decision and one of its most ardent supporters made
that same assumption. 314 As Professor Kamisar pointed out, “[t]he
assertion of rights or their waiver is supposed to occur shortly after the
curtain goes up—not postponed until the second or third act.” 315
Although the Thompkins majority’s discussion of pre-waiver
interrogation did include two somewhat cryptic citations to Miranda, the
Court derived its primary precedential support from Butler. That is, the
Court argued that the implied waiver doctrine was “inconsistent with a rule
that requires a waiver at the outset.”316 But, while Butler did suggest that
Miranda waivers can be inferred from “a course of conduct indicating
waiver,” it did not specify when that “course of conduct” must occur. 317
The question of timing or sequencing was not before the Court in that case.
In fact, allowing police to conduct pre-waiver interrogation and then
support a finding of implied waiver based on “the whole course of
questioning” 318 is contrary to what Butler (and, of course, Miranda)
expressly provided—that proof of implied waiver cannot be premised
simply on a confession. 319
312

This includes both manuals published in the wake of Miranda, see INBAU & REID,
supra note 7, at 1 (commenting, one year after Miranda, that police may conduct
interrogations “after the recently prescribed warnings have been given to the suspect. . . , and
after he has waived his self-incrimination privilege and his right to counsel”), as well as
contemporary ones. See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2270 n.3 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(citing recent manuals, including the current edition of the Inbau and Reid book); Brief for
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the American Civil Liberties
Union as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 11–12, Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (No.
08-1470) (same).
313
See, e.g., 2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 69, § 6.1(c), at 607 (introducing Miranda by
explaining that it protects a suspect from being “questioned unless he waived his rights after
being advised” of the required warnings); Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police
Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV.
839, 858–59 (1996) (observing that a suspect “can refuse at the start of an interview to waive
his rights. . . , thus precluding any interview”); Weisselberg, supra note 149, at 1529 (noting
that Miranda “characterized the warnings and waivers as procedural predicates that must be
met before questioning could be initiated”).
314
See Ronald J. Allen, The Misguided Defenses of Miranda v. Arizona, 5 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 205, 211 (2007) (observing that “in one sense Miranda is quite precise: give the
warnings and get a waiver or you can’t engage in custodial interrogation”); Kamisar, supra
note 4, at 172 (likewise noting that Miranda “conditions [custodial police questioning] on
the giving of certain warnings by the police and the obtaining of waivers”).
315
Kamisar, supra note 4, at 188.
316
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263.
317
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979).
318
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264.
319
See supra notes 255, 257 and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, the Thompkins Court pointed to language in Butler
indicating that waiver can be inferred from “‘the actions and words of the
person interrogated.’” 320 But Butler’s reference to “the person interrogated”
does not signal that police may begin the interrogation process without first
securing a waiver of Miranda (whether express or implied). Given that the
issue of sequencing never arose in Butler, the more plausible reading of this
phrase is that the Court was using “the person interrogated” as a synonym
for “the suspect” or “the defendant.”
The Thompkins Court also observed that the Butler majority “rejected
the rule proposed” by Justice Brennan in dissent, who would have
“‘require[ed] the police to obtain an express waiver of [Miranda rights]
before proceeding with interrogation.’” 321 As discussed in the prior section,
however, the Butler Court’s attention was focused on the question whether
Miranda allowed implied waivers at all or instead required that they be
express, and not on the timing of those waivers. 322 Thus, while the Justices
in the Butler majority obviously did not subscribe to Justice Brennan’s
dissenting views, what they presumably objected to was his requirement of
an “express waiver” and not his suggestion—which simply reflected the
widely held assumption post Miranda—that any waiver must occur
“before” interrogation.
Like the Thompkins majority, the State of Michigan and the Solicitor
General also relied on Butler, echoing the Court’s point that “the decision in
Butler clearly contemplates pre-waiver interrogation.” 323 Their briefs
maintained that without pre-waiver interrogation, nothing is left of the
implied waiver doctrine because police are “effectively requir[ed] to obtain
an express waiver from the inception of the interview.” 324 But the Court
and the parties are wrong to suggest that there is no work for the implied
waiver doctrine to do if the police must secure a waiver of Miranda prior to
initiating interrogation. Butler, for example, sent conflicting signals as to
his willingness to waive his rights, but his refusal to sign the waiver form
was not fatal to the prosecution’s waiver argument given his verbal
agreement to talk to the FBI and his ready response to questions.325 Thus,
the concept of implied waiver is still necessary to support a finding of
320

Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263 (quoting Butler, 441 U.S. at 373).
Id. (quoting Butler, 441 U.S. at 379 (Brennan, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added).
322
See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
323
Reply Brief, supra note 288, at 16; see also Brief for the United States, supra note
227, at 21 (“A rule demanding pre-interrogation waiver also would be inconsistent with the
Court’s implied waiver doctrine.”).
324
Reply Brief, supra note 288, at 18.
325
See Butler, 441 U.S. at 371. Butler was decided before the Court accepted the
concept of qualified waiver in Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987).
321
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waiver in cases where a suspect equivocates about her intentions.
Moreover, the notion of implied waiver is responsive to the contention that,
even though Butler waived his right to remain silent by agreeing to speak to
the FBI, he never waived his Miranda right to counsel. 326 Additionally, as
Justice Alito suggested at oral argument, the implied waiver doctrine
enables the police to interrogate a suspect who does not agree to talk but
does express a willingness at least to listen to the police officer’s
questions. 327 Similarly, the suspect who initiates a conversation with the
police following the administration of Miranda warnings has impliedly
waived her rights and is subject to interrogation.328 Accordingly, Butler
cannot reasonably be interpreted as upsetting the Miranda Court’s
assumptions about the proper sequencing of warnings-waiver-interrogation,
and the continued vitality of the implied waiver doctrine provides no
justification for allowing pre-waiver interrogation.
In addition to Miranda and Butler, the Thompkins majority also relied
on Davis v. United States to support its approval of pre-waiver
interrogation, specifically Davis’s observation that “the primary protection
afforded suspects subject[ed] to custodial interrogation is the Miranda
warnings themselves.” 329 Here again, however, the Court took this
statement out of context. As discussed in the prior section, the Davis Court
was observing in this part of the opinion that the “primary protection” given

326

See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 178, at 33; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra
note 289, at 20 (argument made by Solicitor General’s office). Note, however, that the
Court has never required that each of the Miranda rights be waived individually, but has
assumed that a suspect who responds affirmatively when asked whether she is “willing to
waive her rights” or “willing to talk to us” has made a valid waiver of Miranda. See, e.g.,
Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1200 (2010) (noting that Powell said that he was
“‘willing to talk’ to the officers”) (quoting Powell v. State, 969 So. 2d 1060, 1063 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2007)); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 567 (1987) (“Spring then signed a
written form stating that he understood and waived his rights, and that he was willing to
make a statement and answer questions.”); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 160 (1986)
(“Respondent stated that he understood these rights but he still wanted to talk about the
murder.”).
327
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 289, at 32. Although Justice Kennedy
commented that Thompkins’s behavior “implied the very kind of statement” Justice Alito
posited, id. at 37, a suspect who is in custody, and therefore by definition cannot get up and
leave the room, does not indicate a willingness to listen to the police by spending more than
two hours “looking down” and speaking a few words “very sporadically.” Joint Appendix,
supra note 181, at 152a, 9a.
328
E.g., United States v. Gell-Iren, 146 F.3d 827, 829 (10th Cir. 1998) (suspect asked to
“talk confidentially” to an FBI agent); Stawicki v. Israel, 778 F.2d 380, 383–84 (7th Cir.
1985) (finding that suspect’s “request to speak to” another detective who had left the room
“prior to confessing indicated his willingness to make a statement”).
329
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994), quoted in Berghuis v. Thompkins,
130 S. Ct. 2250, 2263 (2010).
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suspects is Miranda’s first layer (the warning and waiver procedures set out
in Miranda itself) and that suspects must act affirmatively in order to
trigger the “‘second layer of [Miranda] prophylaxis’” (the protections
accorded suspects who invoke their rights).330 But Davis did not purport to
effect any changes in the first layer or to disturb the warnings-waiverinterrogation sequencing that Miranda envisioned—and that was
scrupulously followed by the investigators who questioned Davis. 331
Not only did the Thompkins Court misconstrue the precedents it did
cite, it also ignored the implications of the decision in Oregon v.
Bradshaw. 332 Bradshaw invoked his right to counsel, thus placing himself
under the protective shield of Edwards, but a plurality of the Court found
that he then lost the Edwards protection by asking, “Well, what’s going to
happen to me now?” and thereby “‘initiat[ing] dialogue with the
authorities.’” 333 The opinion did not end there, however. Rather, the
plurality said—and all but Justice Powell agreed334—that “[s]ince there was
no violation of the Edwards rule in this case” (given Bradshaw’s initiation),
“the next inquiry” was whether the prosecution had sustained its burden of
proving that Bradshaw had “‘validly waive[d]’” his rights.335
Bradshaw’s admonition that initiation and waiver are “separate”
inquiries 336 suggests that Miranda divided the universe of suspects into
three categories: those who invoke their rights (and fall under the protection
of Edwards or Mosley), those who waive their rights (and may be
interrogated), and those who neither invoke nor waive their rights. The last
group—the suspects in limbo as it were—are not entitled to the special
330

Id. at 458 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176 (1991)). For further
discussion of this language, see supra notes 266–72 and accompanying text.
331
See Davis, 512 U.S. at 454–55.
332
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983) (plurality opinion).
333
Id. at 1044–46 (quoting Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 46 (1982) (per curiam))
(concluding that Bradshaw’s question was not “merely a necessary inquiry arising out of the
incidents of the custodial relationship,” but instead “evinced a willingness and a desire for a
generalized discussion about the investigation”). Justice Marshall’s dissent rightly pointed
out, however, that the question “might well have evinced a desire for a ‘generalized’
discussion” if “posed by Jean-Paul Sartre before a class of philosophy students,” but here
showed only Bradshaw’s “‘desire’ . . . to find out where the police were going to take him.”
Id. at 1055 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
334
See Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1050 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that
a “two-step analysis could confound the confusion” surrounding Edwards).
335
Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1046 (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 486 n.9
(1981)) (emphasis added).
336
Id. at 1045 (calling the initiation and waiver “inquiries . . . separate,” and rejecting the
state court’s view that a suspect’s “‘initiation’ of a conversation or discussion . . . not only
satisfied the Edwards rule, but ex proprio vigore sufficed to show a waiver of the previously
asserted right to counsel”).
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protections afforded by Edwards and Mosley, but they may not be subjected
to interrogation until they execute a waiver of their rights. Bradshaw’s
initiation of further discussion with the police took him out of the
“invocation” box and returned him to “limbo.” But the police could not
justify interrogating him until they were able to move him into the “waiver”
box by securing some sort of waiver of his Miranda rights. Thus, the
Bradshaw plurality pointed out, Edwards barred “further interrogation” of a
suspect who asserted the right to counsel (and did nothing to initiate further
communication), but Edwards “did not . . . hold that the ‘initiation’ of a
conversation by a defendant . . . would amount to a waiver of a previously
invoked right to counsel.” 337
Bradshaw’s support for the notion that Miranda created three
classifications of suspects cannot be reconciled with Thompkins’s concept
of pre-waiver interrogation. The Thompkins Court effectively saw only two
types of suspects: those who invoke their rights and those who waive them.
Thus, in putting Thompkins in the latter category, the Court reasoned that
“a suspect who has received and understood the Miranda warnings, and has
not invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right to remain silent by making
an uncoerced statement to the police.”338 By thereby assuming that every
suspect who has not invoked her rights is deemed to have waived them and
eliminating the “limbo” box, the Court undermined the well-established
propositions that suspects may not be presumed to have waived their
rights 339 and that silence does not constitute waiver. 340 Likewise, it
contradicted the admonition that waiver and invocation are “entirely distinct
inquiries” that should not be “blurred” or “merg[ed] together.”341
Not only is the three-box paradigm faithful to Supreme Court
precedent, it also resolves the slippery slope concerns raised at oral
argument in Thompkins. Until the police administer Miranda warnings and
secure a waiver, they may not engage in any behavior that rises to the level
of “interrogation” under Rhode Island v. Innis, 342 whether they do so for
hours (as in Thompkins) or only for a few minutes. 343 On the other hand,

337

Id. at 1044.
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2264 (2010).
339
See supra notes 258–59 and accompanying text.
340
See supra notes 255, 257 and accompanying text.
341
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984) (per curiam); see also supra notes 241–42
and accompanying text.
342
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01 (1980); see supra note 74.
343
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 289, at 51–52 (Justice Kennedy and
Chief Justice Roberts asking Thompkins’s attorney whether her “argument would be the
same if [the interview] was compressed to 45 minutes” or even “30 seconds”).
338
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anything they do short of “interrogation” prior to obtaining a waiver does
not violate the warnings-waiver-interrogation sequencing. 344
In addition to trying to shoehorn its decision into its precedents, the
Thompkins majority also attempted to defend pre-waiver interrogation on
pragmatic grounds. In advancing its pragmatic argument, the Court made
the interesting observation that the interrogation process can provide
suspects with “additional information” and help them make “a more
informed decision, either to insist on silence or to cooperate.”345 This
reasoning is fundamentally different from the core premise about the
coerciveness of custodial interrogation that underlies Miranda and is
reiterated in subsequent Supreme Court opinions. Given that premise, the
only “additional information” the police are likely to be willing to provide
will be designed to “overbear the [suspect’s] will” and “trade[] on [her]
weakness.” 346 In Thompkins, for example, the officers admittedly were not
trying to educate the suspect about his options, but to “[e]licit . . .
information . . . pertinent to [the] investigation.” 347 They did so by trying to
convince him—erroneously, of course—that telling his side of the story was
to his advantage, 348 and even by giving him (in Detective Helgert’s words)
“disinformation” about a confession his accomplice had purportedly
made. 349
Moreover, the Court’s pragmatic defense of pre-waiver interrogation
explicitly rested on its assumption that when suspects are aware that
Miranda rights “can be invoked at any time,” they have “the opportunity to
reassess [their] immediate and long-term interests.” 350 Although the
Miranda opinion spoke of the importance of the “right to cut off
questioning,” Chief Justice Warren did not include it among the four

344
The same analysis applies to the tactic of “softening up” suspects even prior to
administering Miranda warnings. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Police Deception Before
Miranda Warnings: The Case for Per Se Prohibition of an Entirely Unjustified Practice at
the Most Critical Moment, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1239, 1260–62 (2007); Weisselberg, supra
note 149, at 1555–57.
345
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2264 (2010).
346
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 455 (1966); see also supra notes 302–06 and
accompanying text.
347
Joint Appendix, supra note 181, at 16a (testimony of Detective Helgert admitting that
he spent “that whole period of time . . . using your skills as a detective and your training as a
detective, and your experience as a human being, and police officer to attempt to [e]licit
from Mr. Thompkins information which might be pertinent to your investigation for this
offense”).
348
See supra notes 181–82, 193 and accompanying text.
349
Joint Appendix, supra note 181, at 149a (testimony of Detective Helgert).
350
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264.
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mandated warnings. 351 Thus, Miranda does not require that suspects be
told they can assert their rights and end the interrogation at any time—even
though some police departments (like Southfield, Michigan 352) have added
this information to their Miranda forms. 353 In jurisdictions that choose not
to do so but only to supply the baseline of advice required by Miranda,
suspects often do not realize that they can change their mind, invoke their
rights, and thereby put an end to the interrogation. 354 In those cases, then,
the Thompkins Court’s confidence that suspects can “reassess” their options
is misplaced.
Finally, the Thompkins Court’s pragmatic argument is ironic given
other Supreme Court cases where defendants have been the ones seeking
“additional information.” On those occasions, the Court has not hesitated to
reject such requests on the ground that the police need not “supply a suspect
with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding
whether to speak,” 355 or that “the additional information could affect only
the wisdom of a Miranda waiver, not its essentially voluntary and knowing
nature.” 356 Thus, the Court seems to envision that the flow of information
is completely subject to the control of the police, despite Miranda’s efforts
to “‘place the accused on a more equal footing with the police.’”357
351
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474; see also id. (envisioning that suspects may exercise their
rights “at any time prior to or during questioning”); id. at 475–76 (noting that “where incustody interrogation is involved, there is no room for the contention that the privilege is
waived if the individual answers some questions or gives some information on his own prior
to invoking his right to remain silent”).
352
In addition to laying out the four basic Miranda rights, the waiver form provided to
Thompkins said: “You have the right to decide at any time before or during questioning to
use your right to remain silent and your right to talk with a lawyer while you are being
questioned.” Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2256.
353
See Rogers et al., supra note 155, at 131 (reporting that the “vast majority” of police
departments surveyed included this information in their warnings). For specific examples,
see Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 198 (1989); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 567
(1987); Godsey, supra note 59, at 806–07 n.100 (citing examples).
354
See Godsey, supra note 59, at 783–84 (describing the Miranda warnings as “out of
date,” in part because they do not include this information); Stuntz, supra note 25, at 988
(finding that “[a]lmost no one invokes his Miranda rights once questioning has begun”);
Thomas, supra note 6, at 228–29 (suggesting, therefore, that this information be required as
part of Miranda warnings).
355
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422 (1986) (ruling that police need not inform
suspect that an attorney tried to contact him).
356
Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577 (1987) (holding that police need not tell
suspect what crimes will be discussed during the interrogation); see also id. at 576 (“We
have held that a valid waiver does not require that an individual be informed of all
information ‘useful’ in making his decision or all information that ‘might . . . [affect] his
decision to confess.’”) (quoting Burbine, 475 U.S. at 422).
357
2 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 69, § 6.9(e), at 834 (quoting Recent Cases, Frazier v.
United States, 419 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969), 26 VAND. L. REV. 1069, 1076 (1973)).
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This lack of symmetry is part of a larger pattern. The Court has
consistently been willing to give an expansive reading to statements made
by the police and the suspect in the interrogation room when doing so
favors the prosecution, 358 but it has been much more literal and shown
greater reluctance to adopt similarly generous interpretations that support
the defendant. 359 In fact, the decision in Thompkins seems all the more onesided given that the Court reached out to issue a wide-reaching substantive
decision in a case that could have been resolved under the deferential
AEDPA standard of review. 360
From a pragmatic viewpoint, then, the Thompkins opinion falls short.
By endorsing the police procedures used in that case, the Court reversed
widely held assumptions about the proper sequencing of warnings-waiverinterrogation and essentially eviscerated the Miranda doctrine. A police
officer may now read the Miranda warnings in a quick, bureaucratic tone of
voice, trying to give the impression that they are mere formalities,361 ask if
the suspect understands (or just make sure she can read the form or speaks
the language in which the warnings were given 362), wait a split second to
give her “an opportunity to invoke” her rights, 363 and then immediately
launch into the interrogation. This strategy will be foolproof except in the
unusual case where the suspect has the nerve to interrupt and speak up—
and can manage to do so with the specificity needed to satisfy the strict
unequivocal invocation standard. 364 And, given Thompkins’s implied
waiver holding, any statement the suspect makes—even a one-word
response that comes hours into the interrogation session—is then

358

See supra notes 160–72, 332–33 and accompanying text (discussing Florida v.
Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010), and Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983) (plurality
opinion)).
359
See supra notes 197–200, 213, 222–40 and accompanying text (discussing Davis v.
United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994), and Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010)).
360
Compare Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264 (concluding that the state court’s rejection of
Thompkins’s Miranda claim was “correct under de novo review and therefore necessarily
reasonable under the more deferential AEDPA standard of review”), with id. at 2266
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for ignoring “longstanding principles of
judicial restraint,” which “counsel leaving for another day the questions of law the Court
reaches out to decide”). For the standard of review mandated by the AEDPA, see supra note
195.
361
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
362
See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
363
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263.
364
For cases illustrating how high a hurdle this has proven to be, see supra note 225 and
accompanying text.
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considered conclusive evidence that she impliedly waived her Miranda
rights. 365
In so holding, the Court basically reduced Miranda to a formality,
requiring only that the police remember to read the warnings. As such, the
Court allowed the police to engage in tactics not far removed from the
“question first” strategy disapproved in Missouri v. Seibert. 366 To be sure,
the quick recital of warnings came first here rather than midway through the
interrogation, but it is difficult to see how “a reasonable person in
[Thompkins’s] shoes” would have thought “he had a genuine right to
remain silent” when Detective Helgert immediately began the interrogation
process and persisted for almost three hours in the face of almost complete
silence on Thompkins’s part. 367 By the time Thompkins made an
incriminating comment, a reasonable person “would not have understood
[the Miranda warnings] to convey a message that [he] retained a choice
about continuing to [maintain his silence or instead to] talk.”368 Rather than
requiring that the police “‘reasonably “conve[y]”’” Thompkins’s rights, as
the Seibert plurality did, the Thompkins Court endorsed “a police strategy
adapted to undermine the Miranda warnings.” 369
Thompkins is reminiscent not only of Seibert but also of Dickerson, as
it essentially pushes back to center stage the voluntariness due process test
the Court sought to replace in Miranda. 370 Assuming the police administer
the Miranda warnings, the only other road to suppression of a confession
goes through the totality of the circumstances test. Thus, when the
Thompkins Court held that the implied waiver doctrine’s requirement of “a
course of conduct indicating waiver” is satisfied simply by an “uncoerced
statement,” 371 it went on to find that standard met on the facts before it
using standard voluntariness due process analysis, looking at the totality of

365

See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264 (holding that “a suspect who has received and
understood the Miranda warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right
to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police”).
366
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) (plurality opinion); see supra notes 18–21
and accompanying text.
367
Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617, 613.
368
Id. at 617.
369
Id. at 611 (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (quoting
California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 361 (1981) (per curiam))).
370
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); see supra notes 12–17 and
accompanying text.
371
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2262 (2010); see supra notes 245–48 and
accompanying text.
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the circumstances and finding no “facts indicating coercion.”372 Similarly,
at oral argument, when Thompkins’s attorney expressed concern that
allowing the police to “immediately . . . go[] into interview mode” would
lead to “badgering,” Chief Justice Roberts responded: “I thought there was
no dispute on this record that there was no involuntariness. We are talking
about a violation of the technical, important but formal, Miranda
requirements. This is not a case where the person says: My statements were
involuntary.” 373
Moreover, in reaching the conclusion that there was no coercion
undermining the validity of Thompkins’s implied waiver, the majority was
basically satisfied that Thompkins was not “threatened or injured.” 374 The
dissenters, by contrast, invoked Miranda’s admonition that a “lengthy
interrogation” preceding a confession is “strong evidence” of an invalid
waiver—that “the fact that the individual eventually made a statement is
consistent with the conclusion that the compelling influence of the
interrogation finally forced him to do so [and] inconsistent with any notion
of a voluntary relinquishment of the privilege.”375 While the Thompkins
majority did not cite this language, it found “no authority for the
proposition that an interrogation of this length is inherently coercive.”376 In
fact, it then went on to suggest that a finding of implied waiver could be
made even in a case where the suspect held out longer than Thompkins did,
noting that “even where interrogations of greater duration were held to be
improper, they were accompanied, as this one was not, by other facts
indicating coercion, such as an incapacitated and sedated suspect, sleep and
food deprivation, and threats.” 377
Obviously, this is not what the Miranda Court had in mind. There the
Court made clear that its concerns extended beyond the suspect whose
372

Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263; see also id. at 2262 (finding “‘no reason to require
more in the way of a “voluntariness” inquiry in the Miranda waiver context than in the [due
process] confession context’”) (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169–70
(1986)).
373
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 289, at 50. Likewise, in response to
Justice Scalia’s comment, “I assume, that you . . . acknowledge that if the interrogation
had . . . gone on for so long that it had become coercive, then that . . . last statement
would . . . not be a voluntary waiver,” the attorney from the Solicitor General’s Office
replied: “That’s right. But Respondent made a voluntariness argument throughout all of the
courts in this case, and every court has rejected it.” Id. at 30; see also State v. Kirtdoll, 136
P.3d 417, 424 (Kan. 2006) (describing the implied waiver doctrine as “virtually
indistinguishable” from the voluntariness test).
374
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263.
375
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966), quoted in Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at
2269 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
376
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263.
377
Id.
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confession would have been suppressed under the voluntariness due process
test. In fact, the Miranda opinion included an observation that would be an
equally apt description of the facts of Thompkins:
It is not just the subnormal or woefully ignorant who succumb to an interrogator’s
imprecations, whether implied or expressly stated, that the interrogation will continue
until a confession is obtained or that silence in the face of accusation is itself damning
378
and will bode ill when presented to a jury.

Thompkins may not have been “subnormal” or “woefully ignorant” enough,
and the three-hour interrogation session may not have been “lengthy”
enough, to allow him to argue “[m]y statements were involuntary” under
the totality of the circumstances test. But his inability to demonstrate
coercion under the voluntariness due process test does not mean the police
should have been allowed—in direct contravention of Miranda—to begin
interrogating him before he had waived his rights, trying to convince him
that “silence” would be “damning” and leaving him with the distinct
impression that the interrogation was going to “continue” (despite his lack
of participation) “until a confession [was] obtained.”
The predominance given the voluntariness due process test in
Thompkins is likewise inconsistent with Dickerson’s recognition that efforts
to “reinstate[] the totality test” undermine Miranda. 379 And it is even more
anomalous given that the amorphous voluntariness due process test—which
has always been a difficult standard to satisfy and has been “condemned as
‘useless’ . . . ‘legal “double-talk”’” 380—became an even higher hurdle after
Miranda. As Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged in Dickerson, “‘cases
in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a selfincriminating statement was “compelled” despite the fact that the law
enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.’” 381 By
allowing police to reorder the well-established warnings-waiverinterrogation sequencing and reducing Miranda to a mere formality, the
378
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468; see also id. at 457 (disapproving of even police
interrogations that “do not evince overt physical coercion or patent psychological ploys”).
379
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442 (2000).
380
Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 n.4 (1985) (quoting Monrad G. Paulsen, The
Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REV. 411, 430 (1954), and ALBERT
R. BEISEL, JR., CONTROL OVER ILLEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: ROLE OF THE
SUPREME COURT 48 (1955)).
381
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20
(1984)); see also Leo, supra note 24, at 1026 (noting that Miranda “creat[ed] a bright line
but diminish[ed] the salience and effectiveness of the voluntariness test by lulling judges into
admitting confessions with little inquiry into voluntariness”); Louis Michael Seidman,
Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 745–46 (1992) (observing that, in the wake of
Miranda, “many lower courts have adopted an attitude toward voluntariness claims that can
only be called cavalier”).
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Thompkins Court essentially resurrected the voluntariness due process test
in contravention of Miranda, Dickerson, and any semblance of pragmatism.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s pragmatic approach to Miranda has enabled the
Court to chip away at the landmark ruling over the years while stopping
short of permitting deliberate attempts to subvert it. The three Miranda
decisions issued by the Supreme Court last Term—the first to come from
the Roberts Court—certainly did nothing to stem the tide gradually
weakening Miranda. In fact, all eight of the issues resolved in the three
cases were decided in favor of the prosecution.
Interestingly, it was Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Maryland
v. Shatzer 382 that was most sensitive to the policy concerns underlying
Miranda and most faithful to the Court’s pragmatic approach. Both aspects
of the Court’s decision in that case—the recognition of a break-in-custody
exception to Edwards and the ruling that inmates serving prison terms are
not continuously in custody for purposes of Miranda—endorsed the
dominant lower court view and could be defended on pragmatic grounds. 383
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in Florida v. Powell 384 fell in the
middle. In upholding a warning that the state courts had interpreted as
improperly limiting the right to counsel to the time period prior to
interrogation, the Court acted inconsistently with the trend in the lower
courts and extended its own precedents in the area. In addition, the ruling is
harder to justify on pragmatic grounds. Nevertheless, the Court’s decision
was relatively narrow and tied to the particular facts of the case, and
therefore does not give the police a great deal of room to circumvent
Miranda. 385
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the five Justices in the majority in
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 386 however, can neither be discounted as an
incremental change in the law nor reconciled with a pragmatic approach to
Miranda. By putting its stamp of approval on the interrogation techniques
used in that case, the Court basically reduces Miranda’s sixty pages to a
requirement that the police must not forget to read the warnings. Assuming
they are conveyed in a language the suspect can understand, the police are
allowed to move directly into full interrogation mode and then use anything
the suspect says—even hours later—to demonstrate that she impliedly
382
383
384
385
386

130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010).
See supra notes 37–111 and accompanying text.
130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010).
See supra notes 112–76 and accompanying text.
130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).
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waived her rights. Thompkins thereby renders Miranda a mere formality
and resurrects the voluntariness due process test, turning the Court’s love–
hate relationship with Miranda into one of pure disdain. The fact that the
Court chose to reach out unnecessarily and adopt far-reaching substantive
changes on such critical issues—and then did so in such a cursory
fashion—makes the opinion seem even more disrespectful.387
To the extent that the Court’s decisions from last Term, Thompkins in
particular, signal a change in the Court’s commitment to the pragmatic
approach, that shift comes at a fortuitous time for those advocating that
Congress create an exception to Miranda for terrorism cases. 388 In true
emergencies, of course, the government does not need additional legislative
tools. It can already rely on the “public safety exception” created in New
York v. Quarles, which allowed law enforcement officials to dispense with
Miranda warnings before asking questions “reasonably prompted by a
concern for the public safety.” 389
On the one hand, an exception for a particular category of cases would
be narrower than the 1968 Crime Control Bill, which completely
superseded Miranda and reinstated the voluntariness due process test in
federal court. 390 In invalidating that statute, the Court reasoned in
Dickerson v. United States that Miranda was a “constitutional decision”
that may not be “overruled” by Congress.391 An “exception” for terrorism
cases might be distinguished from an “overruling” and thus might survive
constitutional scrutiny despite Dickerson. Moreover, allowing interrogators
to violate Miranda when questioning suspected terrorists seems relatively

387

See supra notes 177–381 and accompanying text. But cf. Friedman, supra note 21, at
5 (arguing that the Court has engaged in the “stealth overruling” of Miranda for some
time—by “disingenuous[ly] treat[ing] precedents in a manner that obscures fundamental
change in the law” and thereby “avoid[s] public attention to the Court’s diminishing of its
own precedents”).
388
See Charlie Savage, Holder Backing Law to Restrict Miranda Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May
10, 2010, at A1 (reporting that the Obama Administration is considering asking Congress to
create such an exception); see also Questioning of Terrorism Suspects Act of 2010, H.R.
5934, 111th Cong. (2010) (bill introduced by Rep. Adam Schiff, which would express “the
‘sense of Congress’” that Miranda’s public safety exception permits “unwarned
interrogation of terrorism suspects for as long as is necessary to protect the public from
pending or planned attacks when a significant purpose of the interrogation is to gather
intelligence and not solely to elicit testimonial evidence”).
389
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984).
390
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006); see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
391
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000).
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tame compared with the “torture warrants” advocated by some
commentators and therefore might be palatable to the Court.392
On the other hand, Dickerson suggests the Court might have similar
qualms about a statutory exception for terrorism cases. The Court might
view a blanket exemption that goes beyond the public safety exception it
already created in Quarles as unconstitutionally interfering with the judicial
prerogative to interpret “constitutional decisions.” Moreover, the Court has
recently been sympathetic to Guantanamo detainees seeking to challenge
their designation as enemy combatants in federal court.393 But the Court’s
refusal to carve out a “terrorism exception” for habeas corpus and
completely foreclose the detainees from access to judicial proceedings does
not necessarily mean it would likewise disapprove of efforts to deny
suspected terrorists the protection of every “prophylactic” procedural rule 394
available to other criminal defendants.395 And certainly any decline in the
Roberts Court’s enthusiasm for the pragmatic approach to Miranda is
bound to affect this calculus.

392

See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT,
RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 131–64 (2002) (suggesting that judges should be permitted
to issue “torture warrants” in extraordinary cases). But cf. Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the
Rack and the Screw: Constitutional Constraints on Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 278, 324–25 (2003) (“conced[ing] that there is room for debate” on the morality
of torture as an interrogation technique where necessary to avert “a threat of mass
devastation,” but rejecting the idea of judges “announc[ing] before the fact that the
Constitution permits torture”); John T. Parry & Welsh S. White, Interrogating Suspected
Terrorists: Should Torture Be an Option?, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 743, 763–64 (2002) (taking
the position that, although “the government should not have the authority to torture even
in . . . extreme circumstances,” individual government agents should resort to torture if doing
so “provides the last remaining chance to save lives that are in imminent peril” and then raise
the necessity defense in “any resulting criminal prosecution”); Marcy Strauss, Torture, 48
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 267 (2003) (arguing that “[w]ithout an absolute prohibition on the
use of torture, it is virtually impossible to ensure that ‘special cases’ remain special”).
393
See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (concluding that foreign nationals held at
Guantanamo Bay may file federal habeas petitions to challenge the legality of their detention
as enemy combatants); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008) (holding that
the procedures created by the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 were not “an adequate and
effective substitute” for habeas); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 633, 567 (2006)
(finding that the Government had not shown a “practical need explain[ing] deviations from
court-martial practice,” and therefore that the “structure and procedures” of the military
commissions convened by President Bush violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice and
the Geneva Conventions).
394
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974) (plurality opinion); see supra note 13
and accompanying text.
395
Cf. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (refusing to allow a
nonresident alien to rely on the Fourth Amendment, which grants certain rights to “the
people” of the United States, to challenge a search by United States officials on foreign soil).
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Given the multiple ways in which the police have adapted to and
accommodated Miranda over the years and the overwhelming rate of
Miranda waivers, perhaps Chief Justice Warren’s opinion was essentially a
dead letter already, an “irrelevanc[y],” 396 an “out of date” 397 “mistake.” 398
If so, then Thompkins merely makes the demise of Miranda more
transparent. That transparency may motivate those who have been critical
of Miranda for not going far enough to search for more meaningful ways to
protect suspects from the coerciveness of custodial interrogation. In the
meantime, one cannot count on the current Supreme Court to adhere to the
pragmatic approach to Miranda taken by its predecessors.

396
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398

Leo, supra note 24, at 1000.
Godsey, supra note 59, at 783–84.
Stuntz, supra note 25, at 975.

